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REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Jordan M. Barry* & Elizabeth Pollman** 
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Numerous corporations, ranging from Airbnb to Tesla, and from 
DraftKings to Uber, have built huge businesses that reside in legal gray areas.  
Instead of taking the law as a given, these companies have become agents of legal 
change, focusing major parts of their business plans on changing the law.  To 
achieve their political goals, these companies employ conventional lobbying 
techniques, but also more innovative tactics.  In particular, some attempt to enter 
markets quickly, then grow too big to ban before regulators can respond.  If 
regulators do take aim at them, they respond by mobilizing their users for 
political support. 
 
 This Article offers the first focused study of what we term regulatory 
entrepreneurship—entering a line of business in which changing the law is a 
significant part of the business plan.  We provide a framework for understanding 
this combination of business and political activity and a detailed account of the 
techniques that these companies employ.  Further, the Article identifies and 
considers the conditions that are most likely to foster regulatory 
entrepreneurship, the prospects for regulatory entrepreneurship going forward, 
and its likely positive and negative implications for lawmaking.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
A number of high-profile companies have devoted enormous amounts of 
time and money to entering lines of business that are legally fraught; the 
applicable laws are unclear, unfavorable, or both.  These companies’ fortunes—
whether they will be bankrupt or worth billions1—often depend not only on the 
whims of the markets, but also on the resolution of legal issues concerning a core 
aspect of their business.  These companies understand this, and each makes 
changing the law a material part of its business plan.  We call this activity 
“regulatory entrepreneurship,” and refer to the companies that engage in it as 
regulatory entrepreneurs.  
 
As regulatory entrepreneurship has become more prominent in recent 
years, two major developments have come to the fore.  First, regulatory 
entrepreneurs have experienced surprising political successes, securing significant 
policy victories over some of the country’s most entrenched industry groups.2  
Second, regulatory entrepreneurship has made huge inroads into startup culture.  
While startups largely used to eschew the political arena, many of the last 
decade’s most successful startup companies are regulatory entrepreneurs.   
 
Perhaps the country’s most famous regulatory entrepreneur, and an 
example that we will return to throughout this Article, is Uber.  Uber’s business is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  We thank Emily Keifer, Jay 
Bryan Barney, Brad Bernthal, Brian Broughman, Michael Burstein, Abe Cable, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, 
Jennifer Fan, Dov Fox, Stavros Gadinis, George Georgiev, Victor Fleischer, Michael Guttentag, 
Christine Hurt, Matthew Jennejohn, Michael Kang, Orly Lobel, Peter Molk, Sean O’Connor, 
Frank Partnoy, Usha Rodrigues, Jeff Schwartz, Ted Sichelman, Gordon Smith, Mila Sohoni, 
Daniel Sokol, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Manuel Utset, and the participants at the Law and 
Entrepreneurship Association Retreat, the U.C. Berkeley Law, Economics, and Business 
Workshop, and the Emory University School of Law faculty workshop. 
1 See In re Napster Copyright Litig., Nos. C MDL 00-1369 MHP, 2006 WL 1348555 (May 17, 
2006) (“[Napster] declared bankruptcy after abandoning its efforts to comply with the preliminary 
injunction entered by this court.”); In re Aereo, Inc., No. 14-13200-2hl, 2014 WL 7721237 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); Nathan McAlone, How Uber Became the Most Valuable Startup in the 
World, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.inc.com/business-insider/how-uber-became-
the-most-valuable-startup-in-the-world.html; Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber Is the Most Valuable 
Startup in the World, CNN MONEY (July 31, 2015, 3:47 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/31/technology/uber-50-billion-valuation/. 
2 For example, Uber has been making serious inroads against the taxi industry, and Tesla Motors 
has chalked up several victories against the car dealership lobby.  See, e.g., Michael Gartland & 
Danielle Furfaro, Voters Think Taxi Industry Had de Blasio in the Palm of Its Hand, N.Y. POST 
(Aug. 10, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/08/10/nyers-think-politicians-tried-to-limit-
uber-due-to-yellow-cab-campaign-cash/; Sonari Glinton, Why Buying a Car Never Changes, NPR 
(Feb. 19, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/02/19/172402376/why-
buying-a-car-never-changes; Lee Hutchinson, FTC Doubles Down on Direct Auto Sales, Says 
“It’s Not Just About Tesla”, CARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 8:49 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/cars/2015/05/ftc-doubles-down-on-direct-auto-sales-says-its-not-just-about-
tesla/.   
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built around its popular smartphone app.3  The app connects people who want 
rides with drivers in the vicinity who are willing to provide them.  Fares are 
determined based on an algorithm that takes into account factors related to supply 
and demand, and Uber takes a percentage of each fare.4  Uber is essentially 
running a taxi dispatch service for the smartphone age. 
   
However, in most cities, the taxi cab industry is heavily regulated.5  Rules 
vary across jurisdictions, but they frequently require cabs to have a special 
government-issued license or medallion; these licenses are typically in very 
limited supply.6  Fares are often based on rigid prescribed formulas.7  Ten years 
ago, many observers would have said that the legality of Uber’s business was 
questionable at best.   
 
Uber was undeterred by these legal issues.  It has aggressively taken on 
taxi regulations (and regulators) and worked to change the laws that govern taxi 
services.  In a very concrete sense, Uber and many other recent startups are built 
around and based upon a plan to change the law—and, in some instances, to 
simply break the law in the meantime.8  For Uber—and many other companies 
like it—political activity has become a critical part of business strategy.      
 
To be sure, corporate political activity is not a new phenomenon.  Such 
activity has been the subject of federal regulation since 1907,9 and has long been 
the subject of public controversy.10  But for much of U.S. history, large, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Uber, https://www.uber.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) (explaining that a user can use their 
phone to “Tap the app, get a ride.”). 
4 See Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, FORBES (June 10, 
2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aswathdamodaran/2014/06/10/a-disruptive-cab-ride-
to-riches-the-uber-payoff/#10a27ac664b8 (explaining the Uber business model). 
5 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The 
Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSPORTATION L.J. 73, 75-76 (1996) (“[N]early all large and 
medium-sized communities regulate their local taxicab companies.”). 
6 See, e.g., id. at 78 (explaining that “[t]ypically, taxis are regulated at the local level, with city or 
county boards restricting the number of firms and number of taxis (with the issuance of 
medallions)” and that municipalities like New York City have strictly limited medallions, causing 
the price “to reach exorbitant levels”); Josh Barro, Under Pressure From Uber, Taxi Medallion 
Prices Are Plummeting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/upshot/under-pressure-from-uber-taxi-medallion-prices-are-
plummeting.html (explaining the medallion system and market).  
7 Barro, supra note 6. 
8 See supra Part II.A. 
9 The Tillman Act prohibited “any national bank or corporation” from making “a money 
contribution in connection with any election to any political office.”  Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed 1976)).  See generally Adam Winkler, Other 
People’s Money: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 
(2004) (providing history).  
10 See Winkler, supra note 9, at 873-74 (arguing that early state and federal regulation of corporate 
political spending was motivated by concern about the corrupt nature of corporate managers 
misusing “other people’s money” as well as “fears about excessive corporate power”); see also 
LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME 
POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 47-71 (2015). 
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established companies dominated corporate political activity, often through trade 
associations.11  And, while corporate lobbying has grown increasingly proactive 
over time,12 it has been rare for a company to adopt a business model that 
explicitly focuses on seeking a change in the law.  Companies have instead 
prioritized lobbying to protect their existing, legal businesses from cost-increasing 
regulations and to insulate themselves from competition.13  For example, U.S. 
auto manufacturers have long lobbied against increased fuel efficiency and 
emissions requirements that would make cars more expensive to produce—but 
these companies were not founded on a plan to roll back already-existing laws 
that made automobile production unprofitable or outright illegal.14   
 
Moreover, the tactics that modern regulatory entrepreneurs are using differ 
from those that companies have historically relied upon to achieve their political 
goals.  The conventional story of corporate political power relies on gaining quiet 
access to officials, then leveraging that access to exert influence behind the 
scenes.15  While regulatory entrepreneurs have used these tried-and-true methods, 
they have become better known, and arguably experienced greater success, from 
the opposite strategy:  They make an issue as publicly salient as possible, rally the 
public to their cause, then use their popular support as a cudgel to beat the change 
they want from resistant officials.   
 
For example, consider Uber’s experience in New York City, the nation’s 
largest market for taxi services and among the most tightly regulated.16  When 
faced with resistance by New York Mayor Bill de Blasio, Uber’s user base was its 
biggest weapon.  Uber offered free rides to passengers willing to attend a protest 
at City Hall on its behalf.17  It used its app to contact drivers and passengers and 
mobilize them to express their opposition to Mayor de Blasio’s proposal, flooding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-
conquered-american-democracy/390822/. 
12 DRUTMAN, supra note 10, at 77, 238; David B. Yoffie & Sigrid Bernstein, Creating Political 
Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 124, 124 
(1985). 
13 See Drutman, supra note 11 (noting that when corporate political activity began to increase in 
the 1970s, leading corporations hired lobbyists and “[t]hey killed a major labor law reform, rolled 
back regulation, lowered their taxes, and helped to move public opinion in favor of less 
government intervention in the economy.”). 
14 Alan Fram, U.S. Auto Lobby’s Clout Flagging, ASSOC. PRESS (June 17, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.presstelegram.com/article/ZZ/20090617/NEWS/906179854.  
15 DRUTMAN, supra note 10, at 30; see also PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS 
POWER: CORPORATE CONTROL IN EUROPE AND JAPAN (2010). 
16 See Alison Griswold, Uber Won New York, SLATE (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:01 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/11/uber_won_new_york_city_it_only_too
k_five_years.html.  
17 Giulia Olsson, Uber Protests Loudly Outside City Hall, N.Y. OBSERVER (June 30, 2015, 4:50 
PM), http://observer.com/2015/06/uber-protests-loudly-outside-city-hall/.  Uber also offered free 
t-shirts and sandwiches to passersby if they agreed to join the protest.  Id.   
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city hall with over 20,000 e-mails in five days.18  Uber also added a notable 
feature to its app: a “de Blasio” button that purported to show how users’ 
experience would change if mayor de Blasio implemented his proposed policy.19  
Users who pushed the button found that the app consistently predicted a twenty-
five minute wait for a pick-up;20 they were then directed to a petition they could 
sign declaring their opposition to the mayor’s proposed rule.21  
 
Uber won its showdown in New York,22 at least for the time being.23  It 
has won many other fights in other jurisdictions across the country24 and around 
the world25 using a similar playbook.  Though it has lost its share of battles,26 
Uber’s overall success in taking on taxi regulations has enabled it to grow into the 
world’s most valuable private start-up corporation,27 with an estimated value of 
more than $60 billion.28   
 
And while Uber is the country’s highest-profile regulatory entrepreneur, 
there are numerous others as well.  For example, consider Airbnb, the country’s 
second-most-valuable private start-up.29  Its business is connecting property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Chris Smith, Battlin’ Bill de Blasio’s Uber Fight, N.Y. MAG. (July 22, 2015, 10:38 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/battlin-bill-de-blasios-uber-fight.html. 
19 Matt Flegenheimer & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in Struggle Over New 
York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/nyregion/city-hall-
and-uber-clash-in-struggle-over-new-york-streets.html; Tina Nguyen, Uber Takes Its War on New 
York City to Another Level, VANITY FAIR (July 16, 2015, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/07/uber-takes-on-nyc-deblasio-over-proposed-driver-cap.  
20 Nguyen, supra note 19. 
21 Edward T. Walker, The Uber-ization of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/opinion/the-uber-ization-of-activism.html?_r=0. 
22 Matt Flegenheimer, Ending Fight, for Now, City Hall Drops Plan for Uber Cap, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 22, 2015, A20; Griswold, supra note 16.   
23 Josh Dawsey, New York City Council Bypasses Mayor Bill de Blasio on Uber Policy, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 7, 2016, 8:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-council-bypasses-mayor-
bill-de-blasio-on-uber-policy-1452217772; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Is on a Collision Course 
with New York City’s Mayor Again, THE VERGE (Dec. 4, 2015, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/4/9851000/uber-nyc-bill-de-blasio-report-investigation-cap-
tax-cuomo.  
24 Uber, Find a City (last visited Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.uber.com/cities; Karen Weise, This Is 
How Uber Takes Over a City, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city. 
25 Uber, Find a City (last visited Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.uber.com/cities; see also Ellen Huet, 
Uber’s Global Expansion In Five Seconds, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/11/ubers-global-expansion/#690cc0177a7a. 
26 Jenny Che, 9 Countries That Aren’t Giving Uber An Inch, HUFFPOST BUSINESS (Aug. 12, 2015, 
12:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uber-countries-governments-taxi-
drivers_us_55bfa3a9e4b0d4f33a037a4b. 
27 McAlone, supra note 1; O’Brien, supra note 1 .   
28 Leslie Picker & Mike Isaac, Uber Said to Plan Another $1 Billion in Fund-Raising, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/business/dealbook/uber-said-to-plan-
another-1-billion-in-fund-raising.html.   
29 Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/; Davey Alba, AirBnB Confirms $1.5 Billion Funding 
Round, Now Valued at $25.5 Billion, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:49 PM), 
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owners and renters with travelers in need of short-term lodging.30  This model has 
required Airbnb to contend with the many jurisdictions that limit short-term 
rentals to hotels and similar enterprises; Airbnb has changed these laws in many 
cities, including its hometown of San Francisco.31  The movement for marijuana 
legalization provides another example of regulatory entrepreneurship:  
ResponsibleOhio recently spent over $20 million pushing a marijuana legalization 
initiative that would have given its backers the exclusive legal right to grow 
recreational marijuana in the state.32  Another regulatory entrepreneur, electric car 
manufacturer Tesla Motors, believes that it must sell its electric cars directly to 
consumers in order to fully succeed.33  This has required Tesla to battle state laws 
that require car manufacturers to sell through franchised dealerships,34 and it has 
already achieved significant victories in several states.35   
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.wired.com/2015/12/airbnb-confirms-1-5-billion-funding-round-now-valued-at-25-5-
billion/. 
30 Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, AirBnB: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation and 
Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 103-05 (2015). 
31 See, e.g., id. at 107-12; Emily Badger, How Airbnb Just Changed the Housing Laws in San 
Francisco, WONKBLOG (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/10/08/how-airbnb-just-changed-the-
housing-laws-in-san-francisco/.  
32 Anne Saker, What You Need to Know About Marijuana Initiative, CINCINNATI (July 24, 2015, 
12:52 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/06/17/marijuana-ohio-ballotinitiative-
responsibleohio/28897081/.  The group, ResponsibleOhio, ultimately failed. Jackie Borchardt, 
Pro-Marijuana Group ResponsibleOhio Dead, Founder Says, Won’t Press Ballot Issue in 2016, 
CLEVELAND (Jan. 14, 2016, 6:10 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2016/01/pro-
marijuana_group_responsibl.html; David A. Graham, Why Did Ohio’s Marijuana Legalization 
Push Fail?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/where-did-ohios-marijuana-legalizers-go-
wrong/414061/. 
33 There is some reason to think that traditional car dealerships have poor incentives to promote 
electric cars.  Electric cars require salespeople to invest time and energy to learn about them, and it 
currently takes a salesperson more time to complete the sale of an electric car than a gasoline-
powered one.  Service centers are a major part of modern dealerships, and electric cars such as 
Tesla’s do not require dealer servicing in the way that gasoline-powered cars do.  Many 
dealerships that sell electric and gas-powered cars discourage customers from buying the former 
and encourage them to buy the latter.  See, e.g., Consumer Reports, Dealers Not Always Plugged 
in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports’ Study Reveals, CONSUMER REPORTS (Apr. 22, 2014, 
8:00 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/dealers-not-always-plugged-in-
about-electric-cars-secret-shopper-study-reveals/index.htm; Cliff Weathers, How Tesla and New 
Car Technologies Could Make Auto Dealers Obsolete, SALON (Oct. 11, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/10/11/how_tesla_and_new_car_technologies_could_make_auto_deal
ers_obsolete_partner/.  
34 Daniel A. Crane, Tesla and the Car Dealers’ Lobby, REGULATION (Summer 2014), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2014/7/regulation-v37n2-3.pdf. 
35 See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, Tesla Prevails in Top Massachusetts Court Over Direct Sales, 
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/tesla-motors-massachusetts-
lawsuit-idUSL1N0RG22Y20140915; Matthew DeBord, Maryland Carved Out an Innovative 
Special Exception for Tesla to Sell Cars Directly to Customers, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 15, 2015, 5:31 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/maryland-carved-out-a-special-exception-for-tesla-to-sell-
cars-directly-to-customers-2015-4. 
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While regulatory entrepreneurship has enormous implications for the law, 
it has received scant scholarly attention.  This Article fills this gap in the 
literature, making four original contributions. 
 
First, in Part I, we define regulatory entrepreneurship and place it into 
context.  We discuss how regulatory entrepreneurship differs from other forms of 
corporate political activity, and why regulatory entrepreneurship is a politically 
and economically significant phenomenon.  
 
Second, in Part II, we examine the techniques that regulatory 
entrepreneurs employ in their efforts to change the law.  We identify three 
creative techniques that modern regulatory entrepreneurs have adopted: They 
break the law and take advantage of legal gray areas, real or imagined, asking 
forgiveness instead of permission.  They seek to grow “too big to ban” before 
regulators can act, sometimes referred to as “guerilla growth.”  Perhaps most 
dramatic, they mobilize their users and stakeholders as a political force.  We 
illustrate each of these techniques with multiple real-world examples.   
 
Third, we build on this analysis to determine the conditions that are most 
likely to foster regulatory entrepreneurship.  In Part III, we identify and consider 
three variables that are of particular importance: the nature of the business, the 
nature of the laws creating uncertainty, and the company’s stage and status.  
 
Fourth, we explore the future of regulatory entrepreneurship.  We begin 
Part IV by analyzing the prospects for regulatory entrepreneurship going forward.  
There are some reasons to think that the best opportunities for regulatory 
entrepreneurship are already being exploited.  However, the market has become 
increasingly comfortable with regulatory entrepreneurship as a business strategy, 
and the infrastructure that has been assembled to date will facilitate new attempts 
at regulatory entrepreneurship on an ongoing basis.  Perhaps most importantly, 
information technology continues to advance at an exponential pace.  This will 
lower the cost of political engagement and make it easier for citizens to express 
their preferences, simultaneously creating new opportunities for companies to 
mobilize large groups of people on their behalf.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
regulatory entrepreneurship is likely to increase in the years to come.   
 
We also consider how regulatory entrepreneurship will affect the mix of 
laws and regulations that society ultimately enacts.  One intriguing aspect of 
regulatory entrepreneurship is its potential to combat socially inefficient laws.  
For example, the political economy literature has long observed that some laws 
and regulations provide concentrated benefits to particular interest groups, while 
imposing diffuse costs on the public.36  In these circumstances, the members of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Public choice theory elucidates how citizens can rationally decide not to participate in the 
political process because the costs outweigh the benefits to individual actors.  See, e.g., Michael E. 
Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the Public Agenda: 
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 189 (1990).  Further, because of the rational apathy 
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the relevant interest group have a strong incentive to advocate for the law in 
question.  However, because the law’s costs are spread over a much larger group, 
those who would be hurt by the law have little incentive to actively resist it.37  
This can result in laws being enacted whose costs exceed their benefits.38  
Regulatory entrepreneurs can be a force against such inefficient laws because they 
can lower the cost of civic engagement for their users—the public—and create a 
dynamic in which a new actor is willing to actively push for change. 
 
Yet we do not wish to paint regulatory entrepreneurship as a panacea, or 
even an unmitigated good.  Regulatory entrepreneurs are profit-seeking entities, 
not saints, and they will generally use their political power to pursue the results 
that are best for themselves, not the results that are best for society.  Accordingly, 
regulatory entrepreneurship is unlikely to fully solve any of the pathologies of the 
political system.  Moreover, in some instances, regulatory entrepreneurship may 
have significant negative effects on society.  Overall, the likely effect of 
regulatory entrepreneurship is to make the government more responsive to 
business interests in general and certain types of companies in particular.  
Whether one considers this a positive or negative development will depend on 
one’s view of those interests.   
 
I.  A THEORY OF REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
 All businesses face legal issues as part of their business operations.  And 
companies naturally would like the laws that apply to them to be favorable.   
 
 But some companies enter a line of business that has a legal issue at its 
core—a significant uncertainty regarding how the law will apply to a main part of 
the business operations, a need for new regulations in order for products to be 
feasible or profitable, or a legal restriction that prevents the long-term operation 
of the business.  Some companies enter this legally fraught business with the plan 
of eliminating these legal risks and issues by changing the law.  For these 
entrepreneurs, political activity is generally a major component of their business 
models.  Essentially, these companies are in the business of trying to change the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the public, it follows that the law itself will tend to reflect the interests of small, cohesive 
interest groups rather than the public as a whole.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency 
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 909, 920-21 (1994); Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities 
Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, n.131 (2013). 
37 See Levine & Forrence, supra note 36, at 189 (“[T]he high costs to the public of becoming 
informed on issues which are specialized in their concentrated impact considerably influence the 
competition for public attention.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 335, 343 (1974) (discussing the economic theory of regulation and its 
idea that “economic regulation serves the private interests of politically effective groups”).  
38 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 
(1971) (discussing when and why interest groups and industries are able to use regulations and the 
state for their own interests); FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (discussing how rent extraction and political 
extortion can result in law making to the detriment of the general public). 
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law.  We term such businesses “regulatory entrepreneurs,” and this class of 
business activity “regulatory entrepreneurship.”39  Regulatory entrepreneurship is 
not a new phenomenon, but a spate of recent startup and technology companies 
have made it an increasingly salient one.  
 
 Of course, businesses have long engaged in political activity; corporations 
have been involved in U.S. politics since at least the 1800s.40  U.S. corporations 
and their trade associations spend billions of dollars each year on lobbying 
efforts.41  Nonetheless, regulatory entrepreneurship differs from long-established 
forms of corporate political activity in several significant ways.   
 
Historically, corporate lobbying has been primarily a reactive endeavor.  
Companies have long lobbied to insulate themselves against competition.42  The 
growth of the regulatory state, and the increasing involvement of the government 
in the economic sphere, spawned a responsive increase in corporate politicking as 
companies fought to resist cost-increasing regulations—and, if possible, to 
capture the regulators and use them as another tool to insulate themselves against 
competition.43   
 
But by and large, corporate political activities have been, and continue to 
be, conducted by established businesses focused on protecting existing profit 
centers.  It has been rare for a company to enter a line of business with the plan of 
changing the law.  When companies have attempted to change the law, it has 
often been around the edges of existing businesses, shifting the boundaries to give 
a legal, profitable business more room to grow.  For example, U.S. banks used to 
be limited to particular geographic areas; there were many legal hurdles to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 We note that regulatory entrepreneurship is distinct from regulatory arbitrage.  Regulatory 
arbitrage arises when parties change the form of their transaction, but not its substance, in order to 
effect more favorable regulatory treatment.  See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 227, 229-30 (2010) (defining regulatory arbitrage as “the manipulation of the structure of 
a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its 
regulatory treatment”); see also Jordan M. Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 69, 73 (2011) (“[R]egulatory arbitrage is a phenomenon that follows from having 
regulations that fail to take economic reality into account.”); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives 
and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (“Regulatory arbitrage consists of 
those financial transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities 
created by differential regulation or laws.”).  Regulatory entrepreneurship, in contrast, is about 
entrepreneurial activity that takes on significant legal uncertainty. 
40 MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, ELECTIONS 
AND DEMOCRACY 6 (2000); Winkler, supra note 9, at 881. 
41 See, e.g., DRUTMAN, supra note 10, at 8 (“A total of 3,587 individual corporations reported a 
combined $1.84 billion in lobbying expenditures, roughly 56 percent of all the disclosed money 
spent on lobbying in 2012.  Add in another $553 million in spending by trade associations and 
$175 million in spending by business-wide associations, and that’s $2.57 billion in combined 
spending—78 percent of all the money spent on lobbying in 2012.”). 
42 See DRUTMAN, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that corporate lobbying was historically “sparse and 
mostly defensive”). 
43 See id. at 55 (describing “the political awakening of corporate lobbying” that begin in the 1970s 
after a period of new major regulatory laws). 
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opening branches nationwide.44  Profitable banks kept pushing at these 
restrictions as they sought to expand their business, and the effect was a gradual 
weakening of the law’s restrictions over time and a commensurate growth in 
banks’ geographic scope.45  Legal change was valuable and helped fuel growth, 
but it was not a core part of the original business plan when the banks entered the 
business.   
 
 For regulatory entrepreneurs, this is not the case.  They enter lines of 
business knowing that changing the legal environment is important for the 
business’s growth, or even its legality, and with the intention of effecting that 
change.  Changing the law is not a side project, it is an integral part of the 
business plan.   
 
Further, we believe that regulatory entrepreneurship has already proven to 
be a politically and economically significant phenomenon.  Many regulatory 
entrepreneurs have scored significant political victories against some of the 
country’s most entrenched interest groups.  Regulatory entrepreneurs have 
produced legal changes that seemed quite unlikely a decade or two ago, including 
some victories that long eluded established, politically connected firms.   
 
For example, many states prohibit vehicle manufacturers from selling 
directly to customers (“direct distribution”); instead, manufacturers must sell their 
cars through independent dealers.46  States enacted these laws to protect car 
dealers; in addition to imposing dealers as mandatory middlemen, they also make 
it difficult for manufacturers to terminate a dealership, even in the event of poor 
service or salesmanship.47  These laws have been in place for over fifty years, 
despite multiple attempts by the major car companies to pare them back.48 
 
Electric car manufacturer Tesla Motors was founded in 2003 with the goal 
of proving that electric cars could be better than gasoline-powered cars.49  
Because of the differences between gasoline-powered cars and Tesla’s electric 
cars, especially with respect to the way that they are serviced, Tesla concluded 
that car dealers would not have good incentives to promote their cars.50  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS 27-34,144-47 (2015).  
45 Id. at 51-63. 
46 Death of a Car Salesman, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21661656-no-one-much-likes-car-dealers-changing-
system-will-be-hard-death-car-salesman; Elon Musk, To the People of New Jersey, Open Letter, 
Mar. 14, 2014, https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/people-new-jersey. 
47 Musk, supra note 46. 
48 See Death of a Car Salesman, supra note 46; Crane, supra note 34, at 12. 
49 Tesla Motors, https://www.teslamotors.com/about (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
50 Nikki Gordon-Bloomfield, Consumer Reports: Dealerships Don’t Understand, Like Electric 
Cars, TRANSPORT EVOLVED (Apr. 22, 2014), https://transportevolved.com/2014/04/22/consumer-
reports-dealerships-dont-understand-like-electric-cars/; Cliff Weathers, How Tesla and New Car 
Technologies Could Make Auto Dealers Obsolete, SALON (Oct. 11, 2014, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/10/11/how_tesla_and_new_car_technologies_could_make_auto_deal
ers_obsolete_partner/.  
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Accordingly, from the beginning, Tesla’s founders determined that direct 
distribution was critical to the success of its business model.51  Yet direct 
distribution was prohibited in many states.  This means that Tesla started its 
business with the understanding that a change in the law was vital to the 
company’s success.  Given the political realities surrounding dealer franchise 
laws, Tesla knew that it had to create its own lobbying efforts to battle the car 
dealers’ lobby for state legislative reforms.52  Car dealers have successfully 
blocked Tesla in several states, but the company has fought back and is slowly 
winning most of its fights.53  Thus, Tesla has made far greater inroads against the 
car dealership laws than more established car manufacturers have, despite these 
companies’ far greater size, value,54 longevity, and perceived political power.55   
 
Three more points merit emphasis here.  First, we define regulatory 
entrepreneurship as a phenomenon that applies with respect to a line of business.  
For example, Google (now Alphabet) runs its well-known, clearly legal, and 
highly profitable search engine business.  It is also pouring large amounts of 
resources into developing self-driving cars.  Assuming that Google successfully 
develops the necessary technology to support this business, it still will not be 
viable or financially successful in the long term unless states change their laws in 
order to permit self-driving cars to use public roads.56  Google was well aware of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Tesla’s registration statement in its initial public offering acknowledged:  “Implementing our 
business model is subject to numerous significant challenges, including obtaining permits and 
approvals from local and state authorities, and we may not be successful in addressing these 
challenges. . . .[W]e will need to persuade customers, suppliers and regulators of the validity and 
sustainability of our business model.”  Tesla Motors, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 
Registration Statement, Jun. 2, 2011, at 22-23, available at 
http://ir.teslamotors.com/sec.cfm?view=all.  See also Tesla Motors, 
https://www.teslamotors.com/about (last visited Jan. 16, 2016); Crane, supra note 34, at 1. 
52 Crane, supra note 34, at 1; Catherine Ho, PowerMoves, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/11/18/powermoves-scrambling-to-
shape-refugee-policy-after-paris/ (noting that Tesla Motors hired lobbyist to lobby on automotive 
industry issues). 
53 Death of a Car Salesman, supra note 46.  The FTC has come out in support of direct 
distribution auto sales.  See Marina Lao et al., Direct-to-Consumer Auto Sales: It’s Not Just About 
Tesla, FTC (May 11, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-
matters/2015/05/direct-consumer-auto-sales-its-not-just-about-tesla. 
54 As of February 2016, Ford Motor Company had a market capitalization that was more than 
twice the size of Tesla Motors ($45 billion vs. $20 billion).  Yahoo!Finance, 
https://beta.finance.yahoo.com/quote/TSLA?ltr=1; https://beta.finance.yahoo.com/quote/F?ltr=1 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
55 See Ford, Company Timeline, https://corporate.ford.com/company/history.html (last visited Feb. 
1, 2016) (Ford Motor Company was incorporated in 1903); CATHERINE LUTZ & ANNE LUTZ 
FERNANDEZ, CARJACKED: THE CULTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND ITS EFFECT ON OUR LIVES 
(2010) (discussing the “formidable political power” of American automakers). 
56 See Claire Cain Miller, When Driverless Cars Break the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/upshot/when-driverless-cars-break-the-law.html (“Only four 
states and the District of Columbia have passed laws specific to driverless cars, some just allowing 
manufacturers to test cars and none answering every legal question that might come up.”); 
Salvador Rodriguez, California, Google Ready For Autonomous Vehicle Showdown in 2016, I.B. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2:20 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/california-google-ready-autonomous-vehicle-
showdown-2016-2233290 (“California’s lead in the race to autonomous, self-driving vehicles 
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this, and entered the self-driving car business intending to convince states to open 
their roads to its cars.  By doing so, Google is engaging in regulatory 
entrepreneurship, even if Google’s other lines of business and the continued 
viability of Google as a company overall do not depend on a change in the law.   
 
Second, because regulatory entrepreneurship is primarily a profit-driven 
activity, it does not depend on legal formalities.  Regulatory entrepreneurs do not 
necessarily care whether they effect a legal change on a de facto or de jure basis.  
For example, if the relevant regulatory body credibly commits to not enforcing 
the law on the books, that is functionally just as good, from the entrepreneur’s 
perspective, as amending the law.   
 
 Third, distinguishing regulatory entrepreneurs from other entrepreneurs is 
admittedly a matter of degree; at what point does changing the law become 
“important enough” to the company’s business plan that the company becomes a 
regulatory entrepreneur?  Nonetheless, it is useful to recognize that, for some 
businesses, changing the law is a material part of the business plan, and to 
examine the implications that follow from this phenomenon.  
 
II.  HOW REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURS INSTIGATE LEGAL CHANGE 
 
 In this Part, we explore how the most effective regulatory entrepreneurs 
weave together both time-tested and innovative new tactics to create a larger 
strategy for changing the law.  
 
A.  Breaking the Law or Taking Advantage of Legal Gray Areas 
 
 Many regulatory entrepreneurs follow the maxim that it is better to beg 
forgiveness than to ask for permission.  In this context, that translates to “it is 
better to enter markets and start providing services to the public—legally or 
otherwise—than to seek approval from regulators.”  Companies often justify this 
behavior by construing some gray area in the law as permitting the action in 
question.  It helps that regulatory entrepreneurs often have new business models, 
frequently built on new technology:  Because law often lags technology, 
companies may plausibly be able to claim that existing laws do not clearly 
address their precise circumstances.   
 
A motivated entrepreneur can often manufacture a legal gray area, 
blurring the line between outright lawbreaking and aggressive interpretation.  
Even if existing regulations or statutes use broad language that would, when read 
literally, prohibit the company’s business model, companies can take the view 
that officials were not considering the company’s business model when the laws 
were written—how could they, when the model did not yet exist?  Thus, they can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
could come to a grinding halt should the state adopt draft measures announced this week that 
would all but make Google’s driverless vehicles illegal.”). 
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assert that the laws were not meant to cover their new circumstances, and that 
courts will construe them accordingly.   
 
It is difficult to know from an outside perspective whether particular 
companies are deliberately violating laws, and in many instances there is at least 
room for argument about the matter.  For our purposes, it suffices (and we believe 
it is fair) to say that when regulatory entrepreneurs move into a market, they often 
take an aggressively favorable reading of the relevant law, and that the 
correctness of their interpretation—that is, whether or not they are actually 
complying with the law initially—is not a first-order concern.57   
  
This state of affairs—operating and growing their business, while taking 
the questionable position that they are acting within the bounds of the law—
generally benefits regulatory entrepreneurs.  They typically opt to continue it as 
long as possible, which means at least until regulators and enforcement agencies 
come knocking.  Thus, in sum, many regulatory entrepreneurs’ approach includes 
strategically operating in a zone of questionable legality or breaking the law until 
they can (hopefully) change it.  
 
 For example, early in Uber’s operations, the company was reported to 
have received and ignored a cease-and-desist demand from transit regulators in its 
first city, San Francisco.58  The company has followed the same playbook in other 
cities when problems have arisen, even internationally.  Uber and its executives 
have been embroiled in legal battles in Paris, for instance, after refusing to shut 
down its “UberPop” service following the passage of a transportation law that 
made it illegal.59  Despite police crackdowns, Uber has repeatedly paid drivers’ 
fines and continued to advertise on radio stations.60 
 
 Uber’s main competitor, Lyft, has taken a similar approach.  In a court 
filing, the New York state attorney general’s office claimed: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The many public reports of startup companies ignoring notifications of their illegal activity 
suggests that this is part of a larger strategy combining business and politics.  See, e.g., Serena 
Saitto, Inside Big Taxi’s Dirty War with Uber, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 11, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/inside-big-taxi-s-dirty-war-with-uber 
(“Uber’s strategy has been to launch services regardless of the rules and then leverage its 
popularity to force regulators to adapt. So far, that approach has succeeded in about 30 markets in 
North America, . . . where new laws on licensing and safety have been created for so-called 
transportation network companies like Uber are in the process of being approved.”). 
58 Marcus Wohlsen, Uber’s Brilliant Strategy to Make Itself Too Big to Ban, WIRED (July 8, 2014, 
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-to-make-itself-too-big-to-ban/. 
59 See Aurelien Breeden &  Mark Scott, Uber Executives’ Trial in Paris Is Postponed, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/business/uber-france-trial-executives.html; 
Liz Alderman, Uber’s French Resistance, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/ubers-french-resistance.html. 
60 Alderman, supra note 59 (quoting the general manager of Uber France: “We tell [drivers], if you 
get fined, come to us and we’ll support you. We want them to feel as confident as we feel about 
what we’re doing and our interpretation of the law.”). 
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As it has done in every other city in which it operates, defendant 
has simply waltzed into New York and set up shop while defying 
every law passed whose very purpose is to protect the People of 
the State of New York.  Despite being warned and told to cease 
and desist by three separate regulatory and enforcement agencies, 
defendant has thumbed its nose at the law and continued with its 
plan to launch in what could become its largest market.61 
 
 As another example, technology investors have placed bets in the mobile 
payments and virtual currencies space, an area of innovation that raises significant 
legal questions.  Marc Andreessen, the principal of a leading venture capital (VC) 
firm, recounted the advice that one of his lawyers had given on the topic of the 
virtual currency bitcoin62:  “‘Good news guys.  Here you have a financial 
instrument that can be simultaneously regulated as a currency, a commodity, and 
a security. . . Regulators will fight over who, exactly, gets to regulate it, and VC’s 
job is to sneak through the fight.”63   
 
 Yishan Wong, a Silicon Valley angel investor who was an early PayPal 
employee and formerly the CEO of Reddit, explained a similar view:  
 
[I]f you are a startup who feels that the violation of a law (or an 
excursion into a grey and questionable/undefined area of the law) 
will allow you to create a business that provides enormous value to 
people, the tactically wise thing to do is to move forward and try to 
build the business.  Moreover, if your business is not doing 
something morally egregious (e.g. killing people) but simply 
violating the law in a somewhat more minor way, the officers of 
the company bear little more risk than the company being sued out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, People of the State of N.Y. vs. Lyft, Inc., July 11, 2014, available at http://cdn2.vox-
cdn.com/assets/4744462/MOL.PDF. 
62  Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredit, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin 
Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 277 (2015) (“As a type of virtual currency, Bitcoin is a medium of 
exchange that (1) is electronically created and stored, and (2) lacks the backing of a government 
authority, central bank, or a commodity like gold.  Like traditional currency, virtual currencies 
such as Bitcoin can be used to purchase goods and services from any person that is willing to 
accept it as a form of payment.”). 
63 Carmel DeAmicis, Andreessen: Bitcoin is Like the Early Internet, PANDODAILY (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://pandodaily.com/2013/10/03/andreessen-bitcoin-is-like-the-early-internet/ (emphasis added); 
see also Written Statement of Aaron J. Greenspan, Chief Executive Officer, Think Computer 
Corporation, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Nov. 19, 
2013, at 13, available at http://www.aarongreenspan.com/writing/20131118.hsgacstatement.pdf 
(quoting Marc Andreessen); Noam Scheiber, Uber and Airbnb Are Waging a Libertarian War on 
Regulators, NEW REPUBLIC (May 20, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117837/airbnb-uber-
wage-war-regulators-army-customers. (discussing that many financial and payment technology 
companies have made a “rational calculation” to take a “shoot-first/ask-questions-later strategy”). 
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of existence, i.e. they bear little personal risk besides opportunity 
cost.64 
 
 He further explained that “[t]he law and its subsequent enforcement are 
often defined by the will of the people.”65  Moreover, “if there is a business that a 
lot of people like but is in gross violation of the law, it is typically allowed to 
stand, either via a subsequent modification of the law, clarifications in the grey 
area which end up being favorable to the business, or lax enforcement.”66 
 
B.  Growing Too Big to Ban 
 
 Timing plays an important role in a strategy to break the law or operate in 
a gray area of the law:  Early movers may establish a market position that will in 
turn affect their leverage vis-à-vis the government and the ultimate success of 
their business model.  To again quote Mr. Yishan Wong: 
 
In the case of Airbnb, the likely time it will take for entrenched 
business interests to react to Airbnb, for a debate about 
enforcement and clarification of the law, and then for regulations 
to be proposed, debated, amended, passed, and then enforcement 
measures taken is likely to be more time than it will take for 
Airbnb—moving at internet speed—to establish itself as a globally 
viable business.  By the time that happens, the market (i.e. the 
democratic majority) will probably have shifted to favor its 
interests, so long as they continue to operate the business in a way 
that benefits travelers and would-be amateur hoteliers.67 
 
 Other commentators have aptly described this approach as “guerrilla 
growth” or aiming to grow “too big to ban.”68  Growth is important for almost any 
business, but it is particularly so for a regulatory entrepreneur.  Some regulatory 
entrepreneurs pursue rapid growth not just to improve their valuation or prospects 
for profits, but also to gain political advantage against regulators that might seek 
to ban or regulate the business activity.  Business growth can translate to 
consumer popularity that becomes difficult for regulators to ignore.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






68 Wohlsen, supra note 58; Callum Borchers, DraftKings and FanDuel Vie to Become ‘Too Big To 
Ban’, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/11/12/why-are-draftkings-and-fanduel-all-over-your-tv-because-they-want-to-be-too-
big-to-ban/. 
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 Uber again illustrates this point clearly.  Uber makes its money by taking a 
percentage of the driver’s fare.69  On numerous occasions, Uber has dramatically 
cut its prices in order to increase its user base, valuing growth over profitability.70  
At times, Uber has cut its prices to such a great extent that it effectively paid 
customers to use its service.71   
 
Loss leaders are well-known in business,72 but it is rare for a company’s 
main product to be one.73  Ordinarily, this would evoke the old business joke 
about losing money on every sale, but making it up in volume.  But for Uber, this 
was considered a savvy strategy because “[i]f [Uber] gets big enough quickly 
enough, the political price could become too high for any elected official who 
tries to pull Uber to the curb.”74  Another commentator remarked:  “[I]t has 
already outgrown the stage at which its growth could have been squelched by 
aggressive regulatory action, à la the Internet-TV startup Aereo.  At this point, 
any regulatory crackdowns will only serve to define the contours of Uber’s 
dominance.”75  Politicians have taken notice of the political dimension to this 
growth.  A California State Assembly member who sponsored a measure to 
regulate Uber remarked:  “They wanted to get themselves established very 
quickly as the bully you didn’t want to mess with.”76   
  
 Another recent example of companies taking the too-big-to-ban strategy 
includes fantasy sports gaming sites FanDuel and DraftKings.  These companies 
charge a fee for users to play online auction-based fantasy games; the companies 
keep a percentage of the fees and pay out the rest as prizes.77  Both FanDuel and 
DraftKings have prioritized growth over profits; they return large percentages of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ellen Huet, Uber Tests Taking Even More From Its Drivers With 30% Commission, FORBES 
(May 18, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/05/18/uber-new-uberx-
tiered-commission-30-percent/. 
70 Wohlsen, supra note 58. 
71 Id.; see also Uber, Business (last visited Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.uber.com/business (noting 
that “the uberx option is up to 40% cheaper than a taxi”). 
72 A loss leader is a product intentionally sold at a loss in order to stimulate sales of other, 
profitable items.   
73 Wohlsen, supra note 58 (describing how Uber usually takes a 20% commission, but that it cut 
fares in San Francisco and Los Angeles by 25% and made up the difference to drivers, essentially 
paying part of the fare for its passengers in those areas).  
74 Id. (“By drastically lowering its prices, Uber is doing more than increasing its customer base. 
It’s cultivating constituents—the people who will complain when someone in power tries to take 
away their Uber.”). 
75 Will Oremus, The End of the Taxi Era, SLATE (Jan. 8, 2016, 5:58 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2016/01/yellow_cab_in_san_francisco_is_ju
st_the_beginning_uber_s_war_on_cabs_is.html. 
76 Rosalind S. Helderman, Uber Pressures Regulators By Mobilizing Riders and Hiring Vast 
Lobbying Network, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/uber-
pressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-riders-and-hiring-vast-lobbying-
network/2014/12/13/3f4395c6-7f2a-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html. 
77 Ben Fischer, FanDuel vs. DraftKings: Are We Seeing the Future of Sports Wagering?, N.Y. 
BUS. J. (Nov. 18, 2014, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/blog/techflash/2014/11/fanduel-vs-draftkings-are-we-
seeing-the-future-of.html. 
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their revenues back to users in the form of prize money and spend millions on 
advertising during sports broadcasts.78  These firms are credited with creating a 
new industry in fantasy sports that barely existed just a couple of years ago, but 
that is now projected to produce $31 billion in player entry fees and $2.6 billion in 
net revenue by 2020.79   
 
 After a recent determination by New York’s attorney general that the 
gaming sites are breaking the law, FanDuel and DraftKings both released 
statements invoking their size and popularity and questioning the state’s attempt 
to shut them down.  FanDuel’s statement read, in part:  “This is a politician telling 
hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers they are not allowed to play a game they 
love and share with friends, family, coworkers and players across the country.”80  
DraftKings similarly stated:  “We strongly disagree with the reasoning in [the] 
opinion and will examine and vigorously pursue all legal options available to 
ensure our over half a million customers in New York State can continue to play 
the fantasy sports games they love.”81 
  
C.  Mobilizing Users and Other Stakeholders for Political Power 
 
 An especially interesting strategy in the regulatory entrepreneurship 
toolbox has been to use customers and other stakeholders to fight corporate 
political battles.  Not all companies are well-loved enough by the public for this to 
be viable, but for those with the support of their users and stakeholders it has 
proven a particularly effective tactic.  
 
 For example, Virginia’s Department of Motor Vehicles sent Uber a cease-
and-desist order notifying the company that its service was illegal and that it 
needed to immediately cease all operations in the state.82  Uber responded by 
sending a notice to all of its Virginia users, along with the contact information for 
the ordinarily low-profile state official involved in the decision.  Within a few 
days, hundreds of angry Uber customers had emailed the official, inundating his 
inbox and requiring him to work all weekend to respond.83  Uber also hired a team 
of lobbyists in Virginia and, within 48 hours, the state’s transportation secretary 
instructed the DMV not to interfere with Uber drivers.84  Uber lobbyists then 
submitted a proposed temporary operating permit, which state officials granted 
several weeks later, permitting the company (as well as Uber competitor Lyft), to 
continue their normal operations.85 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Noah Kulwin & Kurt Wagner, It’s No Good! DraftKings, FanDuel Deemed Illegal in New York, 
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 Uber has repeatedly used this tactic of sending alerts to riders on their 
phones, asking them to sign petitions or contact public officials at key political 
moments for the company.86  The company reports that nearly half a million 
riders have signed petitions.87  Its users often respond quickly and in vast 
numbers—reportedly at a rate of seven electronic signatures per second in some 
instances.88  When the Illinois General Assembly passed a restrictive measure that 
would negatively impact Uber’s business, Uber used its smartphone app to 
mobilize its army of users.  It inserted a splash screen and emailed Illinois riders 
requesting that they sign a digital petition asking the state governor to veto the 
bill.  Twenty-five thousand supporters signed the petition in its first hour.89  
 
 In Portland, when faced with a city ordinance that was an obstacle to its 
black car ride service, Uber announced on its blog that it would run a one-day 
promotion delivering free ice cream around the city.90  The ice cream “delivery” 
event provided the company with a database of people who were likely to be 
sympathetic to its goals, and who it could then turn into advocates for its ride 
sharing service.91  Almost 1,700 people signed a petition to allow the company to 
operate in the city.92  When Uber later launched its UberX service in the city 
before the service had been officially sanctioned, the company carefully used 
hyper-local marketing to appeal to Portland residents, such as creating an ad with 
a well-known quirky unicyclist bagpiper as the first rider.93  The company then 
threw itself a party at which attendees could take photos with protest signs or send 
a postcard to the mayor.94  In the first four hours, more than 7,000 people signed a 
petition in support of Uber operating its service in Portland.95  Uber’s key political 
strategist, David Plouffe, has drawn a parallel between customers and campaign 
volunteers.96 
 
 Airbnb has also leveraged its users for political advantage.  The company 
recently announced plans to create and support “clubs” in 100 U.S. cities to help 
residents campaign against local rules restricting short-term rentals.97  Airbnb 




89 Id.  The governor eventually vetoed the bill and Uber used traditional lobbying techniques to 
successfully fight a legislative effort to override the veto.  Id. 
90 Weise, supra note 24. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Uber, Portland’s Very Own Unipiper is Rider Zero!, (Dec. 5, 2014), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/pdx/portlands-very-own-unipiper-is-rider-zero/. 
94 Weise, supra note 24. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Heather Somerville, Airbnb to Create 100 Clubs to Advocate for Home-Sharing, REUTERS 
(Nov. 4, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-sanfrancisco-
idUSKCN0ST2RL20151105. 
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likened to local unions.98  The company’s global policy chief stated, “We’ll spend 
what it takes to succeed.”99  
 
 This strategy comes on the heels of Airbnb’s $8.4 million ground 
campaign in San Francisco, in which the company mobilized hosts and guests to 
defeat a local proposition that would have limited short-term rentals.100  Over 
2,000 volunteers knocked on over 285,000 doors in the city in order to gain 
political support for Airbnb’s cause.101  Until recently, such mobilized grassroots 
support for a multibillion-dollar company has been unheard of, or is at least 
highly unusual.102  
 
 And, indeed, this kind of regulatory entrepreneurship raises the question of 
whether such political support can be called grassroots when it has been catalyzed 
from the top-down as part of a corporate strategy.  It was Airbnb’s own global 
policy chief, previously a D.C. political operative, who framed the business as a 
“movement” at a San Francisco news conference:  “There is going to be more 
people doing home-sharing tomorrow than there are today, there is going to be 
more the day after that.  This is now a movement.”103 
 
 Similarly, when fantasy gaming sites FanDuel and DraftKings found 
themselves in the political spotlight, they catalyzed fans and informed them of 
their efforts and what the fans could do to help. 104  Efforts included writing a 
charter for a new fantasy sports trade association, asking a former federal judge 
and attorney general to review the company’s practices, forming an advisory 
board led by a former United States Attorney General for the Southern District of 
New York, and proactively trying to work with state legislators to adopt consumer 
protection requirements such as age verification that would allow the companies 
to continue to operate and grow.105  FanDuel’s CEO further noted that in just two 
weeks’ time the company had secured more than 145,000 signatures on its 
petition “seeking to protect your right to play fantasy sports” and provided a link 
to sign the petition.106 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Id.; Conor Dougherty & Mike Isaac, Airbnb and Uber Mobilize Vast User Base to Sway Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/technology/airbnb-and-uber-
mobilize-vast-user-base-to-sway-policy.html. 
99 Somerville, supra note 97. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Airbnb was recently valued at $24 billion—higher than the valuation of the mega-hotel chain 
Marriott International.  See Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 98. 
103 Id. 
104 Nigel Eccles, FanDuel Open Letter (Oct. 2015), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/FanDuel-Regulation-Letter.pdf. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (“We believe smart regulations should be in place, but some lawmakers are seeking to 
prohibit your right to play fantasy sports as you know it.  We need to remind officials how deep 
and wide the support for fantasy sports is across the country.”). 
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D. More Traditional Political Techniques 
 
 Finally, regulatory entrepreneurs have also taken advantage of the full 
range of traditional lobbying techniques that established firms have typically 
employed.  This includes tactics such as putting political operatives on the board 
of directors or hiring them as key advisers and using professional lobbyists. 
 
 Placing political operatives on the board of directors of a company, 
particularly an early-stage startup company, indicates that regulatory affairs is 
likely crucial to the business and that changing existing laws or making new laws 
may be key to the business model.  Take, for example, Hyperloop Technologies, a 
regulatory entrepreneur startup inspired by billionaire technology mogul Elon 
Musk’s idea of a futuristic vacuum-tube transport network that could transport 
passengers and freight at over 700 miles an hour.107  The company was started 
with the understanding that it would have to change the law or create new law to 
support their nascent, never-done-before technology—persuading governments to 
support futuristic infrastructure, obtaining rights-of-way through cities and across 
vast distances, and navigating transportation laws written for a different era.  The 
technical challenges involved in developing a hyperloop transportation network 
are enormous, but the political challenges are equally monumental.  
  
Hyperloop has prepared for political and legal battles by getting influential 
political operatives involved before those battles have even begun.  When the 
Chief Technology Officer of Hyperloop Technologies first met the company co-
founder, he said “I can build the technology—you’ve got to get me the right of 
way to do it.”108  The co-founder replied, “We’ve got Jim Messina on our board,” 
referring to the campaign manager for President Obama’s 2012 reelection and 
former White House deputy chief of staff.109  In its early stages, the company had 
also met with major politicians, such as U.S. Senate Democratic leader Harry 
Reid.110  President Obama himself had been briefed on the early-stage startup 
company and its vision for ultra-high-speed transportation.111  The company has 
also developed a relationship with Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los Angeles, where 
the startup is based, who has joked:  “I’ve been part of the marketing department.  
I talk about it all the time.  I’ve talked to [U.S. Secretary of Transportation 
Anthony Foxx], the vice president, the president—and they’re not paying me a 
thing!”112  Many other companies have adopted similar strategies.113 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Bruce Upbin, Hyperloop Is Real: Meet the Startups Selling Supersonic Travel, FORBES (Feb. 
11, 2015, 6:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2015/02/11/hyperloop-is-real-meet-
the-startups-selling-supersonic-travel/#2715e4857a0b7dd0afd7313c. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  Jim Messina has also worked for Uber and Airbnb.  Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Caroline O’Donovan, Hyping the Hyperloop:  How A Moonshot Technology Could Become a 
Reality, BUZZFEED (Oct. 11, 2015, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/hyping-the-hyperloop-how-elon-musks-dream-could-
become-a-rea#.ccRqWaX5k. 
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 Hiring professional lobbyists is another technique that regulatory 
entrepreneurs use.  For example, consider once more electric car manufacturer 
Tesla Motors.  To succeed in its fight against dealer franchise laws, Tesla has had 
to battle the car dealers lobby and create its own lobbying efforts for state 
legislative reforms.114  The lobbyists that Tesla has hired have been key to its 
efforts to help win over state legislators.  In Texas, for example, Tesla has spent 
over half a million dollars on lobbyists in each of the past couple of years.115  
Tesla hired several notable local lobbyists, including Mike Toomey, a trusted 
advisor to Governor Rick Perry; Karen Steakley, an ex-deputy legislative director 
for Governor Rick Perry; Craig Chick, a former senior policy adviser for notable 
Texas legislators; and Adam Goldman, whose brother is a state lawmaker.116  The 
company started building a coalition of lawmakers and business groups 
supportive of their cause and hosting legislative staffers at policy forums and 
company receptions.117  These traditional political lobbying techniques have been 
aimed at helping the company to level the playing field against the powerful car 
dealer lobby, which has been politically active and generous in making political 
expenditures for years.118  A Tesla vice president explained:  “We understood the 
political equations.  We would be stupid not to prepare and equip ourselves to 
argue effectively in this Legislature.”119   
 
III.  CONDITIONS THAT FOSTER REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
In this Part, we use the insights from our analysis in Part II to identify and 
consider three basic groups of factors that are particularly important to fostering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Other notable examples of companies involving political strategists in key business positions 
include Uber (David Plouffe), Airbnb (Chris Lehane), and Theranos (Henry Kissinger; George 
Shultz; Sam Nunn; Bill Frist).  Helderman, supra note 76; Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 98; 
Jennifer Reingold, Theranos’ Board: Plenty of Political Connections, Little Relevant Expertise, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:49 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/10/15/theranos-board-leadership/.  
Regulatory entrepreneurs have also engaged consultants who come through the “revolving door.”  
For example, William Haraf, who had been the Commissioner of the California Department of 
Financial Institutions, and on whose watch California’s money transmission law was 
implemented, became Managing Director of Promontory Financial Group, a consultancy which 
advises startups in the virtual currency space.  See Greenspan testimony, supra note 63. 
114 Crane, supra note 34. 
115 Grant Gerke, Tesla Motors Secret Weapon:  Thoughts and Lobbying Efforts, TESLARATI (Mar. 
16, 2015), http://www.teslarati.com/tesla-motors-secret-weapon-thoughts-lobbying-efforts/; David 
Saleh Rauf & Neal Morton, Tesla Gears Up for Texas Lobbying Blitz, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS 
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Tesla-gears-up-for-Texas-
lobbying-blitz-5967219.php. 
116 Saleh & Morton, supra note 115. 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., Bob Adelmann, Tesla Sales Model Upsetting Traditional Auto Dealers, THE NEW 
AMERICAN (Mar. 24, 2104), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/markets/item/17906-tesla-
sales-model-upsetting-traditional-auto-dealers (“In the 2011-2012 election cycle, according to the 
National Institute on Money in State Politics, auto dealers and their employees donated more than 
$15 million to state and local candidates.  In that same cycle, Tesla donated $500.”). 
119 Id. 
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or discouraging regulatory entrepreneurship.  First, we explore factors related to 
the line of business in question.  Second, we consider law-based factors related to 
the nature of the regulatory uncertainty that the entrepreneur faces.  Third, we 
compare the relative advantages of startup corporations versus more established 
businesses.   
 
A.  Business-Related Factors  
 
Some lines of business are better suited to a regulatory entrepreneurship 
model than others.  As discussed in Part II, the strategies that modern regulatory 
entrepreneurs employ to effect legal change require two chief inputs:  The 
traditional methods that corporations have used to exert influence—hiring 
lobbyists, putting politically connected people on their boards, revolving door 
hiring practices, and spending money on political advertisements—primarily 
require money.  But perhaps even more important for the newer techniques that 
regulatory entrepreneurs have been pioneering is a user base that can be mobilized 
as a political force.   
 
What, then, characterizes businesses with the “right” kind of user base?  
Such businesses possess three chief characteristics:  scalability, connectedness, 
and mass appeal.   
 
Scalability refers to the business being able to expand its user base quickly 
and easily.  For businesses to successfully mobilize users against a regulatory 
crackdown, they must have sufficient users to fight back at an early enough point 
in time.  It helps to grow quickly so that regulators, who often move slower than 
entrepreneurs, are unable to squelch the business before it reaches a critical mass.  
Many regulatory entrepreneurs employ a guerrilla growth strategy to achieve 
exactly this result.  The success of such a strategy depends on growing quickly, 
and this cannot be done if expanding one’s user base requires customized service 
or extensive and slow capital investment.  For example, an advertising agency’s 
business is not scalable because its service is customized for each client and 
cannot be standardized.  By contrast, a company whose main product is software 
is easily scalable; the extra cost of adding a new user is negligible.  
  
But while having a large user base is necessary, it is not sufficient.  A 
large user base is of little help if those users are unwilling to act; the company 
must also be able to mobilize those users.  This likely depends on several things.  
The first is the frequency with which users interact with the company.  User 
interactions are opportunities for the company to inform and activate users; the 
more interactions, the better the company’s prospects.  Next is whether the format 
through which the company interacts with its users makes it easy for the company 
to send users information.  How much information the company has about its 
users matters as well; the more that the company knows about its users, the more 
it can engage them in a targeted manner.  For example, legislators are likely to be 
more responsive to comments received from their own constituents than from 
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voters they do not represent.  If the company knows where its users live, it may be 
able to direct individual users’ gestures of support (e-mails, phone calls, signed 
petitions, etc.) to their particular representatives, amplifying their effect.  Finally, 
how motivated will the company’s user base be to act on the company’s behalf?  
This will depend on not only the frequency with which users interact with the 
company, but also on the significance of those interactions.  To the extent that the 
company taps into feelings of identity or more significant needs, users are likely 
to be more willing to engage.  
   
In addition, the composition of the company’s user base matters.  Several 
studies have examined what drives policy changes in the United States, and two 
findings are key for regulatory entrepreneurship:  First, there is a strong status quo 
bias; it is hard to change the law.120  Second, the chances of changing the law are 
greatest when high-earning citizens support the change.121  Thus, a user base that 
contains many affluent users is likely to significantly increase a company’s 
chance of success.   
 
At the same time, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is also 
helpful to have a compelling story to tell.  People remember personal stories; 
putting the right face on an issue is a potent political tool.122  Thus, it helps to 
have a product that also benefits middle- or working-class people, whose stories 
may be more likely to evoke sympathy and support among viewers, as well as the 
affluent.   
 
For example, in November 2015, San Francisco was considering 
Proposition F, an initiative that would have increased restrictions on short-term 
rentals in San Francisco.  In the days leading up to the vote, Airbnb and its 
supporters blanketed the airwaves with advertisements urging voters to oppose the 
measure.123  A number of ads opposing Proposition F featured the stories of 
people who frequently rent out various spaces on a short-term basis.124  All of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 See, e.g., Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUBLIC OPINION 
QUARTERLY 778, 786 (2005); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American 
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573 (2014).   
121 See, e.g., Gilens, supra note 120, at 788-89 (using the preferences of Americans at the ninetieth 
income percentile as a measure of what high-earning citizens prefer); Gilens & Page, supra note 
120, at 568-70 (similar). 
122 See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN 
POLITICAL ADS WORK (2006). 
123 Nancy Watzman, Pro-Airbnb Advertising Dominated Recent Political TV Ads in San 
Francisco, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UALLU18Mk5IJ:https://blog.archive.org
/2015/11/04/pro-airbnb-advertising-dominated-recent-political-tv-ads-in-san-
francisco/+&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (finding that anti-proposition F ads constituted roughly 
two-thirds of all political TV ads; the ratio of television ad minutes opposing prop F to those 
supporting it was over 120:1; the ratio of television ad minutes opposing prop F to those related to 
the mayoral race was more than 35:1).     
124 See, e.g., SF Against F, Maria Is Renting Out Her Home Office, available at 
https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads.  
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these people talked about the difficulties of living in such an expensive city, and 
most told stories about particular financial needs that short-term renting helped 
them to manage, such as financially supporting elderly parents125 and paying for a 
two-year-old daughter’s childcare.126  One ad featured a couple asserting that 
home sharing enables them to go volunteer and teach English to Tibetan refugees 
and impoverished children.127   
 
By contrast, supporters of Proposition F made advertisements that 
suggested a more unflattering view of their opponents, such as “Save the 
Moguls,” which cast rich commercial landlords as the face of short-term 
rentals.128  Another had actors play a variety of unsympathetic figures, each of 
whom gives her reasons for opposing Proposition F.129  Many of these reasons are 
immoral, such as a desire to exclude elderly people from San Francisco and to 
evict minority tenants.130  Others are simply politically unpersuasive, such as a 
character who talked about how short-term rental of his extra room had enabled 
him to fund his artisanal relish production.131  
 
Despite this effort by the proposition’s supporters, Airbnb won its battle 
against Proposition F, as voters rejected it by a 10-point margin.  Other companies 
have successfully employed similar tactics in their political battles.  To take 
another example, during Uber’s battle for New York, it ran advertisements in 
which Uber drivers highlighted how becoming an Uber driver had improved their 
lives.132  They spoke about how their pre-Uber lives were characterized by 
difficulties finding jobs, being unable to pay their mortgages, and struggling to 
make ends meet.133  One said that becoming an Uber driver “was probably the 
best thing that’s happened in [his] life.”134  Another described it as “a blessing . . . 
We don’t just pick people up.  We pick ourselves up.  We pick our families 
up.”135  It asserted that Uber would create 10,000 jobs in New York City over the 
next year, and urged voters to tell mayor de Blasio, who had received significant 
donations from the taxi industry, “Don’t put taxi donors ahead of jobs.”136 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 SF Against F, Meet Cathryn, Your SF Neighbor, supra note 124. 
126 SF Against F, Meet Kate from Glen Park, supra note 124.   
127 SF Against F, Please Join Ken and Ashish from the Castro, supra note 124.  
128 Sharebetter, “Save the Moguls”, available at https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads. 
129 Broke[*]Stuart, [*] Against Prop F, available at https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  Another was determined to protect Airbnb’s profits at all costs; one character opposed 
Proposition F simply because he liked Airbnb’s logo.  Id. 
132 Uber, Mayor de Blasio's Proposal Will Destroy 10,000 Jobs, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFOQ6ID6lvk&feature=youtu.be; Uber, Killing 100,000 
NYC Jobs, With One Taxi-Backed Bill (June 30, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/us-new-
york/killing-10000-nyc-jobs-with-one-taxi-backed-bill/; see also Dan Rivoli, Uber Slams Mayor 
de Blasio with TV Ad Claiming He's 'Giving in to the Taxi Industry', N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 16, 
2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/uber-slams-mayor-de-blasio-tv-ad-article-
1.2293201. 
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advertisement closed with an Uber driver saying “millionaire [cab] medallion 
owners don’t need help.  People like us do.”137    
 
These business-related factors help explain why regulatory 
entrepreneurship has increased so much in recent years.  Many of the most 
successful startup companies in the last few years are “platform” companies.138  
These businesses profit by using technology to connect buyers and sellers on a 
proprietary platform.  Examples include Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and others.139   
 
Platform business models are enormously scalable; if new users wish to 
join the system, they can be added quickly and easily.  Moreover, since these 
businesses are built around the platform, these companies are well-equipped to 
communicate with their users.  Depending on the product and user in question, the 
user’s level of commitment to the company can be quite large.  For example, an 
Uber driver or an Airbnb landlord—or a provider on a lesser-known platform, 
such as zTailors, the “Uber for tailors”—may reap hundreds or even thousands of 
dollars a week via their interaction with the app.140  In addition, in many instances 
the regulatory entrepreneur will have a great deal of information about the user, 
such as where she lives and how much she uses the entrepreneur’s product, that 
may potentially allow the entrepreneur to leverage that user more effectively.141   
 
Finally, the most successful of these businesses appeal to both those with 
high incomes and those of more modest means.  New York Uber users include 
high earners willing to pay extra to get a ride home immediately at the end of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Id.; see also Alan Feuer, Uber Drivers Up Against the App, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/nyregion/uber-drivers-up-against-the-app.html (“Uber 
mobilized millions of dollars and an all-star team of political tacticians, but it also made use of the 
sympathetic image of hard-working immigrants telling City Hall that Uber put food on the table 
for their families.”). 
138 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform 7-8, 12-13, (manuscript on file with authors) 
(explaining the definition of platform companies and listing over two dozen); Daniel E. Rauch & 
David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of 
the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015) (discussing various sharing economy peer-to-
peer platform companies); Fortune, The Unicorn List, available at http://fortune.com/unicorns/ 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (listing startup companies valued at $1 billion or more and including 
platform companies such as Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, FanDuel, and DraftKings). 
139 Fortune, The Unicorn List, supra note 138. 
140 See, e.g., Rachel Gillett, Here’s How Much You Could Make As an Uber or Lyft Driver in 20 
Major U.S. Cities, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 20, 2015, 11:40 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-uber-drivers-make-in-each-city-2015-7; Sarah 
Kessler, Secrets of Running A Six-Figure AirBnB Business, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 5, 2013, 1:25 
PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021179/secrets-of-running-a-six-figure-airbnb-business; 
Davey Alba, Instacart Shoppers Can Now Choose To Be Real Employees, WIRED (June 22, 2015, 
5:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/instacart-shoppers-can-now-choose-real-employees/; 
Derek Thompson, The Uber Economy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/is-uber-a-middle-class-job-creator-or-
not/384763/. 
141 See Nancy Scola & Andrea Peterson, Data Is Uber’s Business. But Protecting It May Be Its 
Biggest Weakness., WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/11/18/data-is-ubers-business-but-protecting-it-may-be-its-largest-weakness/. 
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rainy night out, middle-class outer borough residents who have trouble finding 
cabs in their neighborhoods, and Uber drivers who might face serious hardships 
without the income they earn through Uber.142  Airbnb landlords include those 
who need to rent out rooms to guests in order to cover the cost of their housing, as 
well as well-off people who buy investment properties and rent them for profit.143  
These types of broad user bases can maximize a company’s chance of political 
success.   
 
B.  Law-Related Factors  
 
The chance of successfully executing a regulatory entrepreneurship 
strategy depends on a number of factors related to the law in question.  These 
relate to the kind and magnitude of regulatory uncertainty that the entrepreneur is 
taking on.   
 
One important factor is the penalty that the law imposes on violators.  For 
example, if the only penalty is a civil fine imposed on the corporation, pushing the 
boundaries of the law may be an attractive prospect.  If the fine is low enough, the 
business may not even have to worry about changing the law and can simply pay 
fines as they come up.144   
 
On the other hand, if a law provides for the incarceration of the executives 
of a company that violates it, that is likely to serve as a serious deterrent to the 
guerrilla growth strategies that modern regulatory entrepreneurs employ.  For 
instance, in some states, operating an unlicensed money transfer business is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment and a criminal fine;145 this has tamped down 
on mobile payment companies’ willingness to push the boundaries of the 
licensing regimes they face.146   
 
Another key element is whether the law in question is determined at the 
local, state, or national level.  Change at the state and local level is often possible 
more quickly than at the national level.  This is largely by design; the framers 
wanted to ensure that state governments remained important centers of power and 
served as laboratories of democracy and reform.147  The faster pace at which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See Carolyn Said, Airbnb, Uber Cast Themselves As Saviors of the Middle Class, S.F. 
CHRONICLE (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:16 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-Uber-
We-are-the-saviors-of-the-middle-6620729.php. 
143 See Adam Chandler, Is AirBnB a Credible Champion on Income Inequality?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/airbnb-new-york/418272/; Kessler, 
supra note 140; Said, supra note 142. 
144 Uber has operated by paying drivers’ fines in Paris, though this appears to be a temporary 
measure.  Alderman, supra note 59. 
145 See Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 79-98, n.101 
(2013) (examining the legal and regulatory landscape affecting emerging payment systems). 
146 See id. at 109-13; Scheiber, supra note 63. 
147 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
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change is usually possible at the state and local levels makes regulatory 
entrepreneurship more feasible within the “runway” of capital, or timeline, the 
company has to operate.148 
 
Further, state and local political fights generally attract much smaller 
amounts of resources than national fights do.149  It takes less money to make 
waves in state and local politics; at the national level, even a significant amount of 
money can be lost as a drop in the bucket.  For example, consider the 2013 
mayoral race in New York City, the nation’s largest and wealthiest city.  Two 
months before the election, the New York Times reported that in the course of the 
campaign the candidates had mustered a combined total of approximately $35 
million and spent about $30 million.150  In the 2014 New York gubernatorial 
campaign, the candidates spent a combined total of approximately $55 million.151  
In the 2012 Presidential campaign, President Barack Obama and Mitt Romney’s 
campaigns raised and spent roughly a billion dollars each;152 spending on all 
federal elections in 2012 totaled approximately $7 billion.153  Spending enough 
money to have a significant effect at that level can be prohibitively expensive.154  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). 
148 See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 133, 151 (2014) (noting that startup companies typically refer to the “runway” of 
capital they have raised for a certain period of operations). 
149 See The Money Behind the Elections, OpenSecrets.org, available at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (showing that the costs of 
federal congressional and presidential races in recent years have been in the billions versus state 
contributions each significantly less).  
150 How Much the N.Y.C. Mayoral Candidates Have Raised and Spent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/16/nyregion/how-much-the-nyc-mayoral-
candidates-have-raised-and-spent.html?_r=0.  These totals included potential candidates who had 
not officially declared their candidacies, as well as money that a candidate borrowed or transferred 
from another campaign.  Id. 
151 New York Gubernatorial and Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_gubernatorial_and_lieutenant_gubernatorial_election.  
152 The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance.  These numbers include amounts raised by 
the candidates, the national party committees, and each candidate’s chief Super PAC, but not other 
PACS or each candidate’s victory fund.  Id. 
153 Tarini Parti, FEC: $7B Spent on 2012 Campaign, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on-2012-campaign-fec-says-087051.  
154 It is also worth noting that there are limits to what money can accomplish politically.  Some 
economists have argued that campaign spending is much less influential than the conventional 
wisdom would dictate, and some donors have lamented that they are unable to buy more influence.  
See, e.g., Stephen J. Dubner, How Much Does Campaign Spending influence the Election? A 
Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://freakonomics.com/2012/01/17/how-much-does-campaign-spending-influence-the-election-
a-freakonomics-quorum/; Eliza Collins, Charles Koch Bemoans Lack of Influence Over 2016 
Race, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/charles-koch-2016-
presidential-race-217499#.chuesce:A0Og; Matthew Cooper, Koch Brothers Money Hasn’t Bought 
As Much As You Think, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/05/02/koch-
brothers-money-hasnt-bought-much-you-think-248390.html.  On the other hand, money clearly 
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Another advantage of targeting state or local laws is the added flexibility.  
The large number of state and local jurisdictions enables companies to pick their 
battles in ways that increase their chances of success over time.  The entrepreneur 
can start with the jurisdictions that it finds most promising, or hold off on 
targeting a particular location of interest until conditions are favorable.  It can 
decide to abandon a particular strategy, delay, or expand.  Moreover, the 
entrepreneur does not have to win every battle to achieve some measure of 
success.155  These options are generally not available when the law in question is 
national.    
 
Further, flexibility is useful because political environments fluctuate over 
time, and changing political headwinds can make it easier or harder to exert 
influence and alter the law.  These fluctuations are driven by economic and social 
conditions that are generally difficult or impossible to deliberately influence.  
Similarly, politicians rise and fall.  An entrepreneur may benefit from the popular 
strength of a sympathetic official, or the weakness of an antagonistic one.  For 
instance, in 2009, billionaire Michael Bloomberg spent $102 million of his own 
money to help finance his successful mayoral campaign.156  Non-billionaire Bill 
de Blasio spent about one tenth of that during his successful campaign four years 
later.157  If an entrepreneur were looking to use its money to pressure the mayor’s 
office, it might well find that its chances were much better during the latter’s time 
in office.  Conversely, if the mayor’s office favored the entrepreneur’s proposed 
change, acting earlier might have been preferable.     
 
There are also tactics available at the state and local level that are not 
available at the national level.  For example, in 2014, Uber wanted to open in 
Portland, but faced opposition from the city government.158  In response, Uber 
began offering service in Vancouver, Washington, which is a stone’s throw away 
from Portland, then sent the message “Hey Portland, we are just across the river . . 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
has some impact on elections and donors must have some reason for making the contributions that 
they do.    
155 DraftKings and FanDuel are an example of this approach.  According to one source:   
[They] have chosen which states to operate in based on the individual rules in that state, 
which vary. . . As recently as October, the two companies were operable in 45 states—in 
the other five, they had chosen not to operate because the law appeared unfriendly.  Very 
recently, that number has gone to 44 after Nevada’s Gaming Control Board ruled these 
companies gambling operators.  It now threatens to go down to 43 because of New York.  
Daniel Roberts, FanDuel, DraftKings File Lawsuits Against NY Attorney General, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/fanduel-draftkings-lawsuits-schneiderman/. 
156 Celeste Katz, Mayor Bloomberg Spent $102M on Campaign to Win Third Term - or $175 Per 
Vote, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayor-
bloomberg-spent-102m-campaign-win-term-175-vote-article-1.414005.  
157 See Michael Howard Saul, Here’s How Much Money is in the Mayor’s New Campaign 
Account, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/07/09/heres-how-
much-money-is-in-the-mayors-new-campaign-account/ (noting de Blasio “raised roughly $10.7 
million, received nearly $4 million in public funds and spent about $13.6 million”). 
158 Weise, supra note 24.  
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. .”159  Uber proceeded to begin offering service in several adjacent suburbs of 
Portland.160  As Portland’s mayor described the experience, “They basically 
forced their way into the market and surrounded us, then put the pressure on for 
us to do likewise.”161  Strategies such as that, which rely on geographic proximity, 
are less likely to work well when applied at the national level; it seems harder to 
imagine a company pushing through a legal change in the United States on the 
grounds that Canada and Mexico both adopted it.    	  
And, because regulatory entrepreneurship is a form of politicking, it is 
better-suited to the more political branches of government.  An army of users is 
more likely to be a compelling tool against executive and legislative bodies than 
judicial ones.  Judges are particularly unlikely to be swayed by popular opinion if 
their terms are longer and if they are appointed instead of elected.162  This further 
advantages state battles over federal ones; in many states and cities, judges are 
elected, while judges in federal district and appellate courts are appointed for 
life.163  On the other hand, when a company finds itself in court, the longer that it 
can drag out the proceeding, the more time it may have to grow its user base and 
lobbying arm and push for a legal change. 
 
For example, DraftKings and FanDuel had been operating in the shadow 
of the law, each spending more than $100 million on television advertising and 
signing up tens of thousands of users each day, before receiving a cease-and-
desist order from the New York state attorney general.164 The attorney general 
wrote: “It is clear that DraftKings and FanDuel are the leaders of a massive, 
multi-billion dollar scheme intended to evade the law and fleece sports fans across 
the country.”165  Both companies continue to operate, attempting to rally users to 
support their legal cause, and have each filed lawsuits seeking an injunction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Id.; Uber, Hey Portland, We Are Just Across the River… #WeWantUberPDX, UBER 
NEWSROOM, July 18, 2014, https://newsroom.uber.com/pdx/hey-portland-we-are-just-across-the-
river-wewantuberpdx/. 
160 Weise, supra note 24. 
161 Id. 
162 See Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 657, 666 (1999); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives 
on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9 (2003) (“In exercising judicial independence, the 
stakes for the judges, that is, the loss of the judgeship, are clearly higher for judges with limited 
terms than they are for appointed judges with life tenure.”). 
163 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008) 
(examining “elective versus nonelective judiciaries”). 
164 Walt Bogdanich et al., Attorney General Tells DraftKings and FanDuel to Stop Taking Entries 
in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/sports/football/draftkings-fanduel-new-york-attorney-
general-tells-fantasy-sites-to-stop-taking-bets-in-new-york.html. 
165 State of New York Office of the Attorney General. Notice to Cease and  
Desist and Notice of Proposed Litigation Pursuant to New York Executive Law § 63(12) and 
General Business Law § 349 (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/10/sports/document-final-nyag-fanduel-letter-11-10-
2015-signed.html. 
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against the cease-and-desist order.166  DraftKings retained the same high-profile 
lawyer who represented Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election.167  The 
company filed a petition against the attorney general, seeking to stop him “from 
carrying out his threat to banish from this State a lawful industry beloved by 
hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers.”168  FanDuel has taken a similar 
approach.  The legal battles may drag on for significant periods of time, while 
they continue to grow and encounter battles in other states.169   
 
Many of the highest-profile companies that attempted a regulatory 
entrepreneurship strategy and failed did so because they found themselves 
fighting national laws in federal courts.  One of the most famous examples was 
Napster, the peer-to-peer file sharing program.170  Many of the files shared on 
Napster were copyrighted works, and the Recording Industry Association of 
America ultimately sued Napster in federal court for contributory and vicarious 
infringement of copyright.171  The suit brought Napster publicity and further grew 
its user base, but this did not help Napster when it lost in court.172  Napster was 
eventually forced into bankruptcy.173  Other companies in the same space have 
encountered similar problems, including Grokster, Kazaa, MusicCity, and 
Limewire.174   
 
More recently, Aereo lost a high-profile Supreme Court case regarding the 
legality of its business.175  Aereo’s business model was based on making 
television content that networks broadcast over the airways available to 
subscribers via streaming over the Internet.176  This raised questions of copyright 
infringement.177  Aereo attempted to lobby the FCC and Congress for changes in 
the relevant laws and regulations, both before and after it lost in court, but 
ultimately failed and had to enter bankruptcy.178   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Roberts, supra note 155. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id.; see also Davey Alba, Now Texas Says DraftKings and FanDuel are Gambling, WIRED 
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/now-texas-says-draftkings-and-fanduel-are-
gambling/ (noting legal battles for the companies in states other than New York). 
170 See Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 273-76 
(2006) (recounting Napster’s history). 
171 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, 
reversed in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
172 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).   
173 In re Napster Copyright Litig., Nos. C MDL 00-1369 MHP, 2006 WL 1348555 (May 17, 
2006). 
174 Zittrain, supra note 170, at 286-93. 
175 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
176 Dan Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548-51 (2015) (describing 
Aereo’s technology). 
177 See id. 
178 See In re Aereo, Inc., No. 14-13200-2hl, 2014 WL 7721237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 
Katy Bachman, Rockefeller Wants to Give Online Video Services Parity with Cable, AD WEEK, 
Nov. 12, 2013, http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/rockefeller-wants-give-online-video-
services-parity-cable-153795; Brian Fung, Aereo to the FCC: Let Us Join the Cable Companies 
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Of course, there have been some regulatory entrepreneurs who have 
succeeded with regulatory entrepreneurship strategies in federal court.  In the 
early days of videocassette recorders (VCRs), it was unclear whether their use on 
copyrighted programming constituted copyright infringement.179  If so, the 
manufacturers were potentially liable and the business model would not have 
been viable.180  However, the VCR manufacturers successfully won in the 
Supreme Court, saving the business.181     
 
The early days of Federal Express provide another good example of a 
company making its business viable by changing the law at the federal level.182  
Federal Express was founded in 1971, and in 1976 it began lobbying hard for the 
deregulation of air cargo transport.183  It succeeded in 1977—a very rapid 
turnaround for a change in federal law.184  But in some ways this example shows 
how rare this kind of success can be, as a number of factors came together in 
ways that Federal Express could neither have controlled nor predicted.  First, 
Flying Tiger Line, Federal Express’s largest competitor, completely changed its 
position on the existing statutory regime and joined Federal Express in pushing 
for deregulation.185  This was especially notable because the chair of the House 
Subcommittee on Aviation, which had killed Federal Express’s prior attempts to 
change the law, represented the district in which Flying Tiger’s headquarters were 
located.186  Second, Federal Express benefited from a number of useful allies—in 
particular Alfred Kahn, the Chair of the regulatory body charged with overseeing 
Federal Express.187  This confluence of factors is rare, and generally beyond the 
control of the regulatory entrepreneur.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
We Tried to Replace, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/13/aereo-to-the-fcc-let-us-join-the-
cable-companies-we-tried-to-replace/.  
179 See Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651, 666-67 (2015) 
(describing how even after oral argument in Sony, the majority of Supreme Court justices were 
initially inclined to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s copyright infringement ruling). 
180 See id. at 664 (noting that Sony “was making a significant amount of money selling devices 
designed to copy copyrighted television programs” and describing this as “the trumpet problem” 
of “making money because of works written by others”); see also JAMES LARDNER, FAST 
FORWARD (2002). 
181 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
182 This is perhaps a border case of regulatory entrepreneurship.  Fed Ex was not started, nor did it 
begin cargo delivery, planning to or thinking that it needed to change the law.  Instead, after its 
strategy of navigating the existing regulations failed, it later decided that it needed to change the 
law to be viable, and succeeded in doing so.  For an excellent discussion of the FedEx case, see Jill 
E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005).   
183 Id. at 1503-05, 1512-15. 
184 Id. at 1515. 
185 Id. at 1514-16. 
186 Id. at 1514. 
187 Id. at 1513. 
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C.  The Prevalence of Startups as Regulatory Entrepreneurs 
 
Finally, in addition to the general business and law-related factors at play, 
it seems significant, and not random, that startup companies seem to represent a 
disproportionately large share of regulatory entrepreneurs.  There are several 
reasons for startups’ relative prevalence or edge over more established businesses 
in the area of regulatory entrepreneurship.   
 
First, by their nature regulatory entrepreneurs are innovators.  A large 
body of literature examines startups and established companies’ relative merits at 
fostering innovation and new technologies.188  There may be a historical aspect to 
this narrative of innovation, as before 1980, fewer than 200 very large and 
established corporations accounted for most R&D in the United States.189  But 
since 1980, the growth in private R&D in the U.S. economy is attributable to 
relatively small and new companies.190 
 
Second, as discussed in Part II, “guerilla growth” is one of the key tactics 
that regulatory entrepreneurs have deployed.  When deployed successfully, 
companies become “too big to ban” before regulators can crack down.  The 
regulators’ timeline is difficult for an entrepreneur to control.  Thus, the success 
of this strategy hinges on the entrepreneur’s ability to enter a market and grow as 
quickly as possible.   
 
Silicon Valley startups are known for trying to grow their user base as 
quickly as possible and to worry about making money later.191  For years, startups 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 See, e.g., Joshua Lerner, Small Businesses, Innovation, and Public Policy, in ARE SMALL FIRMS 
IMPORTANT? THEIR ROLE AND IMPACT (Zoltan J. Acs ed., 1999); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE 
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 45 (1997); 
Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002); CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION 135-37 (2d ed. 1982); Zoltan J. Acs & Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small 
Firms: An Empircal Analaysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678 (1988); Charles P. Himmelberg & Bruce 
C. Petersen, R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, 
76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 38 (1994); Janet E. L. Bercovitz et al., Firm Capabilities and Managerial 
Decision Making: A Theory in Innovation Biases, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: OVERSIGHTS 
AND FORESIGHTS (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 1997);  but see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not 
Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L.R. 537, 
551-52 (1998) (finding that numerous studies of innovation and small business are inconclusive). 
189 Robert M. Hunt & Leonard I. Nakamura, The Democratization of U.S. Research and 
Development after 1980, at 8-9, fig.2 (Soc’y for Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 121, 2006), 
available at http:// www.repec.org/sed2006/up.12143.1138646305.pdf. 
190 Id. at 9; see also Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2008).  
191 E.g., Matthew Braga, Twitter’s Road to IPO: Grow First, Monetize Later, FIN. POST (Sept. 13, 
2013), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-tech-desk/twitters-road-to-ipo-grow-first-monetize-
later?__lsa=61db-bf2c (discussing companies like Twitter, Facebook, Dropbox, and Pinterest that 
had a “grow first, monetize later” philosophy); Nitasha Tiku, Look At How Quickly the Values of 
Multi-Billion-Dollar Startups Have Multiplied, THE VERGE (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/20/8075053/look-at-how-quickly-the-value-of-multi-billion-
dollar-startups-have (“Build momentum now, figure out how to make money later—otherwise, 
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have been entering businesses that did not have well-established precedents.  It 
was not always clear what the best way would be for these businesses to monetize 
their user base.  However, the industry consensus was that (1) it would be possible 
to monetize the user base—that is, the business would be profitable, one way or 
another—and (2) more users were essential to the company’s long-term value.  A 
list of examples in this vein comes quickly to mind, such as YouTube,192 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.193  This created an environment in which 
industry executives prioritized rapid growth and users over profits.194  Over time, 
this produced an increased focus on how to achieve rapid growth, which in turn 
led to the development of people with expertise in how to accomplish this goal.   
 
By and large, many of these companies have become viewed as big 
success stories.195  These successes have been supported by an ecosystem of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
you’ll miss out on the next near-mythic exit.”); Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane 
Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-so-
many-billion-dollar-tech-companies (noting how startup investors look to the number of users in 
valuing the company and “salivate over what’s called ‘hockey-stick’ growth curves, indicating 
massive uptake”). 
192 E.g., Nicholas Jackson, Infographic: The History of Video Advertising on YouTube, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/infographic-the-history-
of-video-advertising-on-youtube/242836/; Rolfe Winkler, YouTube: 1 Billion Viewers, No Profit, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/viewers-dont-add-up-to-profit-for-
youtube-1424897967. 
193 See David Holmes, Social Sites Have Found a New Monetization Strategy and It Leaves Indie 
Creators Out in the Cold, PANDO (Feb. 13, 2015), https://pando.com/2015/02/13/social-sites-have-
found-a-new-monetization-strategy-and-it-leaves-indie-creators-out-in-the-cold/ (discussing the 
history of monetizing online technology); Braga, supra note 191. 
194 See Frier & Newcomer, supra note 191 (noting that a “tech startup’s cash flow is less important 
than you might think” but investors “look to find the number of people using the product, 
regardless of whether they pay for it”); Claire Cain Miller, Popularity or Income? Two Sites Fight 
It Out, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/technology/start-
ups/21twitter.html?_r=1&hp (discussing several high profile tech startups that succeeded with a 
strategy of prioritizing user growth rather than profits); Dan Primack, Tech IPOs: Profits Don’t 
Matter, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/03/26/tech-ipos-profits-dont-matter/ 
(noting that “profits don’t really matter when it comes to tech IPOs” and “[t]oday’s IPO buyers 
care about two key metrics: (1) Growth. (2) Total available market, into which that growth can be 
realized.”); Eric Kutcher et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow, MCKINSEY & CO. (April 2014), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow (“Growth 
trumps all.”). 
195 Either because they succeeded in becoming profitable, were purchased by other companies at 
large valuations, or conducted successful initial public offerings.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 194 
(“Successes like YouTube, the online video site sold to Google for $1.65 billion in 2006, 
convinced some venture investors that building a Web site with a large number of users could still 
be more valuable than making money from paying customers.”); Larry Popelka, What We Learned 
From Twitter’s IPO: The Value of Innovation Is at an All-Time High, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-18/what-we-learned-from-twitter-s-ipo-
the-value-of-innovation-is-at-an-all-time-high (noting that Twitter had a successful IPO, becoming 
one of the most valuable companies in the world at a $25B valuation based not on profit but on the 
value of its great innovation). 
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investors who are willing to accept large amounts of risk and uncertainty,196 
support growth-focused strategies, and take a long-term view.  Angel investors, 
many of whom are successful ex-entrepreneurs, and the venture capital market 
make early-stage financing feasible for high-risk, high-return businesses.197  Most 
angel investors like being involved in exciting new ventures, and view the 
potential to disrupt entire industries as an added bonus.198  Thus, startup investors 
are willing to take the long view of companies’ business prospects, even those 
companies that have never operated profitably.  For example, although neither 
DraftKings nor FanDuel has yet proven profitable, each startup company is 
already valued at close to $1 billion.199  Airbnb, valued at almost $25 billion, 
forecasts that its business will lose $150 million in 2015, and that it will not be 
profitable (even excluding interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) until 
2020.200  Uber, whose valuation of over $60 billion makes it the world’s most 
valuable private startup, loses “boatloads of money,” reporting net operating 
losses of $470 million on $410 million in revenues.201   
 
In contrast, established businesses and their investors tend to operate on 
more well-trodden ground.  For example, coal mining is an old business with a 
long track record.  There are clearer expectations for how a coal mine will make 
its money—it is going to sell coal.  There are many other coal mining companies, 
and previous years of the company’s own operating results, to compare the 
company’s performance against.  It is easier to evaluate how well the business is 
performing, and it is harder for an established company to argue that big, positive 
changes are looming on the horizon.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Legal risks are just one of many types of bet-the-company risks that startup companies may be 
facing, and often is not even identified as one of the top risks in startup companies.  See Sreekanth 
Ravi, When Launching Your Startup, Consider These 5 Risks, ENTREPRENEUR (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/234094 (discussing product risk, market risk, financial risk, 
team risk, and execution risk); Thomas Oppong, The 10 Biggest Risks That Prevent VCs From 
Funding Your Startup, ALL TOP STARTUPS (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://alltopstartups.com/2014/08/27/biggest-startup-risks/ (noting venture capitalist Marc 
Andreessen listed the following as risks that will cause potential investors to decide not to invest: 
founder risk, market risk, competition risk, timing risk, financing risk, marketing risk, technology 
risk, product risk, hiring risk, and location risk). 
197 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market:  Lessons From the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068-69 (2003); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling 
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405 (2008). 
198 See Ibrahim, supra note 197, at 1412, 1419. 
199 Robert Klemko, How Daily Fantasy Is Changing the Game, MMQB (Oct. 8, 2105), 
http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2015/10/08/fanduel-draftkings-scandal-daily-fantasy-football-dfs. 
200 Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb’s $24 Billion Valuation, 
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-math-of-airbnbs-24-billion-
valuation-1434568517.  
201 Biz Carson, Uber Is Reportedly Losing Boatloads of Money, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 29, 
2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-reportedly-operating-at-a-470-million-loss-2015-6; 
Eric Newcomer & Jing Cao, Uber Bonds Term Sheet Reveals $470 Million in Operating Losses, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-
30/uber-bonds-term-sheet-reveals-470-million-in-operating-losses.  
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Similarly, endeavoring to change the law is jeopardous.  Politics is a 
complicated arena with many competing interest groups and sources of 
uncertainty.  It is difficult to predict whether an attempt to change the law will 
succeed, or what unintended consequences it might produce, on the legal system 
or otherwise.  Startups without established businesses have little to lose 
economically from such shakeups.  Culturally, startups often pride themselves on 
being disruptive and changing the world; startup employees tend to view these 
shakeups optimistically.202  One prevalent cliché about startups, sometimes 
mocked in popular culture, is that they attract people who “want to make the 
world a better place.”203  Startup entrepreneurs are “socialized to believe that most 
problems can be fixed with enough money and engineering.”204  Furthermore, 
startup culture, particularly in Silicon Valley, has become known to foster a 
certain libertarian-leaning, free-market ideology that views technology that 
appeals to the masses as democratic.205  Given this confluence of factors, it is not 
surprising that startups might be inclined to “Move Fast and Break Things,” as 
Facebook’s motivational posters implored its employees to do.206   
 
Established companies, almost by definition, have stable, profitable 
businesses.  This gives them reason to worry about radical changes to the law that 
might undermine or even eliminate those businesses; no one wants to kill the 
golden goose in attempt to get more eggs.  Moreover, a new and uncertain line of 
business will demand a large amount of managers’ finite attention, which can 
detract from the company’s already-developed business lines.  Established 
companies might also be dissuaded from pivoting their business models to ones 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Indeed, the term “disruptive” has become so overused in Silicon Valley that some companies 
have started consciously avoiding it.  See Max Nisen, How ‘Disrupt’ Got Turned Into An 
Overused Buzzword, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-silicon-
valley-killed-disruption-2013-9; Emily Inverso, The Most Obnoxious and Overused Startup 
Jargon, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emilyinverso/2015/03/16/the-most-
obnoxious-and-overused-startup-jargon/#785d552740c9. 
203 See, e.g., Adam Levene, Beyond Disruption: The Age of the Impact Entrepreneur, WIRED (Oct. 
2014), http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/10/the-age-of-the-impact-entrepreneur/; Sam Biddle, 
TechCrunch Speaker Combines Every Possible Startup Cliché, VALLEYWAG (May 6, 2014), 
http://valleywag.gawker.com/change-the-world-power-influence-innovation-hand-g-1573559085. 
204 Brian Fung, The Real World Is Undermining Silicon Valley’s Apolitical Fantasyland, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/08/20/the-real-
world-is-undermining-silicon-valleys-apolitical-fantasyland/. 
205 Paul Carr, Travis Shrugged: The Creepy, Dangerous Ideology Behind Silicon Valley’s Cult of 
Disruption, PANDO (Oct. 24, 2012), https://pando.com/2012/10/24/travis-shrugged/ (“To 
proponents of Disruption, the free market is king, and regulation is always the enemy.”); Fung, 
supra note 204 (“A belief in permissionless innovation is what gives the tech industry its 
libertarian streak.”); Gregory Ferenstein, Silicon Valley Represents An Entirely New Political 
Category, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 8, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/08/silicon-valley-
represents-an-entirely-new-political-category/ (noting that author conducted a political psychology 
study of the tech industry and “[t]he results suggest that Internet startup founders represent an 
entirely distinct, libertarian-like ideology within the Democratic party.  Tech startup founders see 
the government as an investor in citizens, rather than as a protector from capitalism.”). 
206 Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 4, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-10-04/facebook-the-making-of-1-billion-
users. 
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that require regulatory entrepreneurship because they fear the bad press that might 
come from being seen as operating in a legal gray area or breaking the law.  More 
generally, established businesses and customer relations require a certain degree 
of stability and predictability.  They tend to be larger and thus have more levels of 
internal hierarchy.  Their employees tend to be older than startup employees, and 
they tend to attract employees who prefer the more stable prospects that come 
from working at an established business to high-risk, high-reward startup 
employment.   
 
Despite these obstacles, established companies are capable of engaging in 
regulatory entrepreneurship as well.  Google is perhaps the best example.  Its 
founders have remained committed to taking on big and complex problems and 
applying creative solutions, and warned prospective IPO investors that Google 
would continue to take on moonshot projects after it went public.207  One of the 
company’s most important moonshot investments is the self-driving car project.208  
This project always had at its heart the obstacle that it would have to change the 
law to be viable.  To date, Google is a leader in self-driving car technology, and 
has persuaded California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and Washington D.C. to 
pass laws that allow public road testing.209   
 
Yet Google is, in some ways, the exception that proves the rule.  Though 
now a well-established company, it began as a startup that experienced 
tremendous success, and its startup culture persists, at least in part.  Further, 
Google’s founders put in place a dual-class stock structure which guaranteed that 
they would retain control of the company and could not be forced to change 
course by dissatisfied outside investors.210  This structure, combined with the 
perception that they are visionary tech leaders and the deference that the market is 
willing to accord them as a result, gives Google significant freedom to engage in 
regulatory entrepreneurship, as well as take on other types of risky projects.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Alphabet Investor Relations, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter From the S-1 Registration Statement, 
“An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s Shareholders, available at https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-
letters/2004/ipo-letter.html (“We will not shy away from high-risk, high-reward projects because 
of short term earnings pressure. . . Do not be surprised if we place smaller bets in areas that seem 
very speculative or even very strange when compared to our current businesses.”). 
208 Steven Levy, Google’s Larry Page on Why Moon Shots Matter, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 
AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/01/ff-qa-larry-page/. 
209 Alex Knapp, Nevada Passes Law Authorizing Driverless Cars, FORBES (June 22, 2011); Dino 
Grandoni, Among the States, Self-Driving Cars Have Ignited a Gold Rush, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/automobiles/self-driving-cars-ignite-gold-rush-
among-states.html. 
210 Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849, 
900 (2012); Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-
share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control/; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Thorny Side Effects 
in Silicon Valley Tactic to Keep Control, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:16 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/thorny-side-effects-in-silicon-valley-tactic-to-keep-
control/. 
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Even so, investors became increasingly uneasy about both the amount and 
opacity of Google’s spending on far-out technology projects that were unrelated 
to its core business of advertising and search.211  Ultimately, Google responded to 
mounting investor pressure by embarking on a major reorganization of its 
business.  According to one former Google executive:  “It was getting harder and 
harder to hide the costs of some of the company’s projects,” especially as some of 
these speculative ventures were bound to fail, and “It’s easier to take the core 
business and run it like a Fortune 500 company.”212 
 
Google, Inc. recently restructured to a holding company, Alphabet, Inc., 
with a host of subsidiaries.213  Under the new structure, Alphabet has partitioned 
off the moonshot technology projects into a separate subsidiary, X, framed as 
Alphabet’s incubator.214  The projects that turn into viable businesses will be spun 
off or “graduated” as their own standalone companies.215  Google’s self-driving 
car project is expected to “graduate” into its own company soon.216   
 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
In this final Part, we explore how regulatory entrepreneurship will likely 
continue to shape our laws in the years to come.   
 
A. The Prospects for Regulatory Entrepreneurship Going Forward 
 
The factors that we examined in Part III offer insight into the likely 
prevalence of regulatory entrepreneurship going forward.  Anticipating the law-
related factors necessarily means making some predictions about the course of 
politics and future policy making, which is a difficult prospect at best.  We simply 
note that the national government is currently divided and gridlocked due to 
increased political polarization, and that this state of affairs may continue for 
some time.217  If so, relative inaction by the national government in many spheres 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See Alistair Barr & Rolfe Winkler, Google Creates Parent Company Called Alphabet in 
Restructuring, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-creates-new-
company-alphabet-1439240645. 
212 Id. 
213 Google, Google Announces Plans for New Operating Structure, Aug. 10, 2015, 
https://investor.google.com/releases/2015/0810.html. 
214 Mark Bergen, Google X Has a New Logo and New Plan to Turn Moonshots Into Actual 
Businesses, RECODE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://recode.net/2016/01/13/google-x-has-a-new-logo-and-
new-plan-to-turn-moonshots-into-actual-businesses/.   
215 See Barr & Winkler, supra note 211. 
216 Bergen, supra note 214. 
217 See Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in the American Public (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ (discussing 
upward trend in political polarization); Pew Research Center, Partisan Polarization Surges in 
Bush, Obama Years (June 4, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/04/partisan-
polarization-surges-in-bush-obama-years/ (same); Unprecedently Dysfunctional, THE ECONOMIST 
(Sept. 22, 2014, 5:52 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/political-gridlock. 
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will leave more issues for state and local governments to address, and more room 
for those governments to maneuver.218  This could produce a more favorable legal 
landscape for regulatory entrepreneurship.219   
 
Similarly, future prospects for regulatory entrepreneurship will depend on 
the health of the ecosystem that supports and promotes startups.  A mature 
industry has arisen around providing startups with capital; this has come with 
infrastructure—such as people with experience evaluating startup investment 
opportunities—that is likely to prove durable.220  Venture capital is a crucial part 
of the ecosystem, but it includes other participants as well such as angel investors, 
accelerators, and incubators.221  In addition, recent legal changes have opened up 
new avenues for investment in startups.222  Also importantly, investors have 
become increasingly comfortable with regulatory entrepreneurship as a business 
strategy, and the infrastructure that has been assembled to date will facilitate this 
on an ongoing basis. 
 
But perhaps the most important factors for the future of regulatory 
entrepreneurship are business-related.  As noted previously, the growth of 
platform companies has been a significant driver of increased regulatory 
entrepreneurship.  One might therefore expect that the prospects for regulatory 
entrepreneurship are tied, at least in part, to the fate of new platform companies.   
 
There are some reasons to think that new platform companies will have 
issues achieving large, connected user bases and significant amounts of capital.  
Both of these are important for regulatory entrepreneurship:  Skillful use of a 
large, connected user base has become arguably the most effective weapon in the 
modern regulatory entrepreneur’s arsenal.  Money is also important—companies 
that can credibly threaten to commit lots of resources to political battles, and to be 
able to stay in the game for the long haul, are more likely to succeed than those 
that cannot.223   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Moreover, at the federal level, congressional gridlock makes it more likely that Presidents will 
seek to accomplish their political goals through administrative agencies and other executive 
actions.  To the extent that it is easier (harder) for companies to influence executive action, this 
will further promote (discourage) regulatory entrepreneurship. 
219 See supra Part III.B. 
220 See Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, $58.8 Billion in Venture Capital Invested Across U.S. in 2015, 
According to the MoneyTree Report, Jan. 15, 2016, http://nvca.org/pressreleases/58-8-billion-in-
venture-capital-invested-across-u-s-in-2015-according-to-the-moneytree-report-2/; Darian M. 
Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717 (2010). 
221 Brad Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, STANFORD J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2016); 
Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note220; Dana Thompson, Accelerating the Growth of the Next 
Generation of Innovators, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 279 (2013). 
222 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding, Oct. 
30, 2015, https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html; Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity 
Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561 (2015). 
223 See, e.g., DRUTMAN, supra note 10, at 238; Helderman, supra note 76.   
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One issue that platform companies face is that they are, by their nature, 
middlemen who profit from facilitating transactions between other parties.  
Consequently, the parties the platform connects have an incentive to try and cut 
the platform company out of the transaction.224  In many instances, this may be 
achievable.225  Circumvention is generally a manageable problem for Airbnb and 
Uber because of the nature of their underlying businesses.  Travelers usually go to 
different places over time, so they cannot simply reuse the same Airbnb host over 
and over.  Uber passengers usually want to find the driver closest to their location 
at the moment they need a ride.  This is not easy to do without their app.  There 
are other platform companies whose business models provide similar safeguards 
against being easily circumvented.226  But, for many platform companies, this is a 
major issue that can greatly undermine the user base and financial resources that 
the company needs to be politically effective.227  Furthermore, even if a new 
platform company did not suffer from circumvention issues, regulatory 
entrepreneurship will only be appealing if there is a potentially changeable law 
that materially affects the value of the business.  Combined, this would seem to 
suggest that only a narrow range of businesses stand to gain from a regulatory 
entrepreneurship strategy.   
 
However, we believe that there is an even stronger argument that the 
business fundamentals favor increased regulatory entrepreneurship in the years to 
come.  This argument is sometimes referred to as the “back half of the 
chessboard” argument.228  The name of this argument comes from a legend that 
the inventor of chess was brought before the king, who offered him a reward for 
his great invention.  The inventor asked for a grain of rice to be placed on the first 
square of a chessboard; then two grains on the second square the next day; four 
grains on the third square the day after; eight grains on the fourth square the day 
after that, and so on, doubling the previous day’s total each day until the sixty-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Cf. Jordan Barry et al., Voluntary Transaction Costs (giving a similar example in more detail).   225	  For example, imagine a platform that connects people who need haircuts to stylists, similar to 
Glamsquad or StyleBee.  The stylist and customer, once they have been introduced, can easily 
contact each other to conduct future business without going through the platform.	  
226 For example, Cherry allowed people to park anywhere and then call someone nearby to clean 
their car.  The importance of the car washer’s proximity, much like that of an Uber driver, made it 
more difficult to circumvent the company’s app.  However, the company—which likely would 
have needed to change zoning laws in many cities for its business to successfully scale up in the 
long run—went out of business because of low transaction volume.  See Semil Shah, Iterations:  
Lessons We Can Draw from Cherry, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 13, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/13/iterations-lessons-we-can-draw-from-cherry/.    
227 See, e.g., Zeel (provides massage therapists); Your-Mechanic (sends mechanics); TutorSpree 
(connected people with tutors, but was shut down); Urban-sitter (sends babysitters); Washio 
(laundry pick-up and delivery); DogVacay (pet–sitting services); Instacart (grocery shopping 
services); BloomThat (flower delivery); Pager (doctors); Glamsquad (hair and makeup stylists); 
Eaze (medical marijuana delivery).   
228 See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, 
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & 
ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS 
ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY (2001). 
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fourth day.  The king agreed.  Only later did he realize that he had promised the 
inventor more rice than has been produced in the history of the world, and that the 
agreement has bankrupted his kingdom.229    
 
Like the grains of rice on the chessboard, technological progress tends to 
exhibit exponential growth.230  This has been particularly true of the computer 
industry; for the last fifty years, computer technology has doubled in power 
approximately every two years.231  This is sometimes referred to as Moore’s law, 
after the author of the paper that first predicted this pattern.232  When Moore first 
wrote his paper, the degree to which computers would increase in computational 
power, while becoming smaller and more affordable, was almost impossible to 
appreciate.233  Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to wrap one’s head 
around this meteoric growth; many individuals now carry more computing power 
in their pockets than NASA possessed at the time of the moon landing.234  And, 
assuming that Moore’s law continues to hold,235 the next few years will add more 
computing power than the past fifty years, combined—and then the next few 
years will add much more still.   
 
It is hard to predict exactly how all of this additional computing power 
will be used.236  However, it seems a safe bet that we will be increasingly 
connected and accessible—which will give companies new ways to mobilize 
large groups of people on their behalf.  Companies are also likely to have more 
data about their users, and greater ability to organize and analyze this information.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Accounts differ as to whether, upon this discovery, the king rewards the inventor for his 
cleverness by making him a high-ranking advisor, or executes him for tricking the king.  See 
MALBA TAHAN, THE MAN WHO COUNTED: A COLLECTION OF MATHEMATICAL ADVENTURES 113-
15 (1993); SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 228, at 45-47. 
230 This is because technological gains feed into each other, so that today’s gains lead to greater 
gains in the future.   
231 More precisely, the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approximately 
every two years.   
232 See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS 
MAGAZINE at 4 (1965).  Gordon E. Moore is the founder of Intel.   
233 See, e.g., Nick Carr, How Many Computers Does the World Need?  Fewer Than You Think, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2008), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/feb/21/computing.supercomputers (“In the early 
1940s, IBM’s President, Thomas J. Watson, reputedly said: ‘I think there is a world market for 
about five computers.’”). 
234 See, e.g., A Modern Smartphone or a Vintage Supercomputer: Which Is More Powerful?, 
PHONEARENA (June 14, 2014), http://www.phonearena.com/news/A-modern-smartphone-or-a-
vintage-supercomputer-which-is-more-powerful_id57149 (quoting physicist Michio Kaku).   
235 There have been many predictions that Moore’s Law will fail over the last fifty years.  To date, 
they have all proved wrong.  For example, Gordon Moore himself predicted in 1995 that Moore’s 
Law wouldn’t hold after 2005.  He then updated his prediction in 2005, predicting that it would 
last until between 2015 and 2025.  In 2015, he updated once again, saying that it would end in 
2025.  See The End of Moore’s Law, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/04/economist-explains-17 (collecting 
these and other examples).   
236 See, e.g., Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things Is Far Bigger Than Anyone Realizes, WIRED 
Nov. 2014), http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/. 
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This will make companies better able to channel and leverage their users for 
maximum effect.  All of this suggests that regulatory entrepreneurship will be an 
increasingly attractive proposition and that we will therefore see more of it, even 
if we cannot quite anticipate the exact form that it is likely to take.   
 
B.  How Regulatory Entrepreneurship Will Affect Legislation 
 
Because regulatory entrepreneurship may become an increasingly 
common phenomenon, we believe that its effects on lawmaking merit careful 
consideration.  We begin with a discussion of scholarly accounts of the political 
process and how they relate to regulatory entrepreneurship generally.  We then 
turn to some well-known political pathologies and consider the extent to which 
regulatory entrepreneurship might ameliorate them.  Finally, we consider the 
limits of regulatory entrepreneurship’s potential to improve political outcomes 
and assess its likely effects overall.   
 
1. The Political Process 
 
The democratic political process involves a messy, complicated interplay 
of different groups of people pursuing varied goals.  Political scientists and 
economists have proposed a number of frameworks for understanding this process 
and its outputs.   
 
One of the most famous and most popular has come to be known as the 
“Bootleggers and Baptists” framework.237  This name comes from the observation 
that both bootleggers and Baptists supported laws restricting liquor sales.  The 
latter supported these laws because they opposed the consumption of alcohol.  
The former clearly had no such compunction; instead, they wished to profit by 
restricting competition from legal sales of alcohol.  Although these seemingly 
opposed groups had very different preferences and aims, both supported 
regulations on liquor sales and were instrumental in their enactment.  The Baptists 
fulfill important public roles, including presenting a sympathetic face on the 
legislation, building popular support, and providing “moral cover.”238  The 
bootleggers work behind the scenes, contributing resources and “lubricat[ing] the 
political machinery.”239   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson et al., Implicit Taxes Collected by State Liquor Monopolies, 115 
PUBLIC CHOICE 313 (2003); ERIKA MEINS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC OUTRAGE: EXPLAINING 
TRANSATLANTIC AND INTRA-EUROPEAN DIVERSITY OF REGULATIONS ON FOOD IRRADIATION AND 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD (2003); Alan Reynolds, The Politics of NAFTA, 45 NAT’L REV. 20, 
42-43 (1993); Alan E. Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest 
Groups, and the Commerce Class, 69 J. POLITICS 859 (2007); BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS, 
BAPTISTS AND GLOBAL WARMING (1999); Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 
22 REGULATION 3 (2007); Bruce Yandle, Bootlegger and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory 
Economist, REGULATION 12, 12-16 (May–June 1983). 
238 Randy T. Simmons et al., Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in 
the Rational Game and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics, 15 INDEPENDENT REV. 367 (2011); 
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, supra note 267. 
239 Simmons et al., supra note 238, at 368.   
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The bootleggers and Baptists model produces several important insights, 
but for our purposes two are paramount.  First, when pursuing one’s self 
interest—that is, when one is a bootlegger, seeking a policy change for profits—
having a good altruistic cover (that is, Baptists) is very helpful.   
 
The most successful modern regulatory entrepreneurs have proved adroit 
at finding sympathetic groups to serve as the public faces for their issues.  They 
are, in a sense, bootleggers who create their own Baptists.  For example, consider 
how Uber fights political battles with taxi regulators and local governments.  As 
much as possible, Uber makes the public face of the issue its drivers, who stand to 
lose their livelihoods, and its riders, who face unmet transportation needs.240  
Similarly, Airbnb uses hosts who need to rent out spare rooms in order to make 
ends meet;241 Airbnb’s opponents have worked hard to put less appealing faces on 
the issue.242   
 
Companies who do not have ready-made, photogenic Baptists have had 
more difficulty achieving their political goals.  For example, consider Tesla 
Motors’ options for garnering mass public support.  Until recently, its cheapest 
car had a $70,000 price tag, which is well out of most people’s price range, and its 
distribution centers do not hire large numbers of low-income workers.243  Tesla 
has made other arguments to support its regulatory aims, but they have not always 
resonated with the public.244  DraftKings and FanDuel have tried to make their 
users their public face of their fight, lamenting that state governments are 
preventing their users from playing games that they enjoy,245 but may have 
difficulty selling this argument.246  Google’s self-driving cars are haunted by 
public concern that driverless cars will eliminate thousands of existing jobs.247   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Uber, supra note 132. 
241 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.   
242 See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.   
243 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, The Genius of Tesla, SLATE, May 10, 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/05/tesla_model_s_the_electric_car_co
mpany_is_a_little_bit_apple_a_little_bit.html.  
244 Tesla has made arguments based on the beneficial impact its cars will have on the environment, 
particularly with respect to carbon emissions, and by appealing to the principle of consumer 
freedom.  See, e.g., Musk, supra note 46.  The former argument seems undermined by the 
significant percentage of people who do not believe in climate change and the latter by the fact 
that the consumers in question have high incomes and other good car-buying options, perhaps 
making them less sympathetic to many voters. 
245 Kulwin & Wagner, supra note 78. 
246  This is a tricky maneuver because the sites’ large number of casual players might not care 
about the issue and the vast majority of winnings on these sites go to a small group of 
sophisticated players who enter hundreds of contests a day and use advanced mathematical 
techniques to maximize their profits.  See, e.g., Joshua Brustein & Ira Boudway, You Aren’t Good 
Enough to Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy Football, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/you-aren-t-good-enough-to-win-money-
playing-daily-fantasy-football; Drew Harwell, All the Reasons You (Probably) Won’t Win Money 
Playing Daily Fantasy Sports, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/10/12/all-the-reasons-you-probably-
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The second important insight is that changing the law often requires action 
by multiple interest groups with divergent goals.  This raises the question of how 
these groups coordinate their efforts; as one scholar put it, “It seems unlikely that 
the local Baptist preacher and the moonshiners meet in someone’s parlor to 
discuss banning Sunday [liquor] sales.”248  Someone or something else must act 
as intermediaries and coalition-builders, knitting together support from disparate 
groups in order to accomplish legal change.249   
 
The dominant view is that, historically, politicians, and occasionally high-
ranking bureaucrats, have taken on this role.250  Such politicians are sometimes 
described as “political entrepreneurs.”251   
 
Regulatory entrepreneurs have some similarities to political entrepreneurs, 
but they differ in several key ways.  First, political entrepreneurs usually take 
advantage of pre-existing, organized interest groups.252  Modern regulatory 
entrepreneurs, in contrast, have largely identified unorganized groups and 
mobilized them.253  “People for Deregulated Taxicabs,” “People for Short-Term 
Rentals,” and “Citizens Against Car Dealerships” were not established political 
groups that adopted the cause of Uber, Airbnb, and Tesla; instead, these 
companies organized people who were sympathetic to these positions and 
mobilized them to take action.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
wont-win-money-playing-daily-fantasy-sports/.  DraftKings and FanDuel must also contend with 
historic (though waning) unfavorable views of gambling and the fact that they are often fighting 
battles in courts instead of the political arena.   
247 See, e.g., Martin Ford, The Rise of Automated Cars Will Kill Thousands of Jobs Beyond 
Driving, GIZMODO, May 7, 2015, http://gizmodo.com/the-rise-of-automated-cars-will-thousands-
of-jobs-and-n-1702689348; Chunka Mui, Will Driverless Cars Force A Choice Between Lives And 
Jobs?, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2013/12/19/will-the-
google-car-force-a-choice-between-lives-and-jobs/#1f12eea9546e; Zack Kanter, How Uber’s 
Autonomous Cars Will Destroy 10 Million Jobs And Reshape The Economy by 2025, CBS LOCAL, 
Jan. 27, 2015, http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/01/27/how-ubers-autonomous-cars-will-
destroy-10-million-jobs-and-reshape-the-economy-by-2025-lyft-google-zack-kanter/; Sam Tracy, 
Autonomous Vehicles Will Replace Taxi Drivers, But That's Just the Beginning, HUFFINGTON 
POST, June 12, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/autonomous-vehicles-will-
_b_7556660.html. 
248 Simmons et al., supra note 238, at 368. 
249 Sociologists Neil Fligstein and Douglas McAdam have recently theorized the nature of social 
change, from political movements to market meltdowns, and have included the idea of “internal 
governance units” which they define as organizations or associations who play a connecting role 
with state actors and who provide information to actors within a “strategic action field.”  NEIL 
FLIGSTEIN & DOUGLAS MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 77 (2012). 
250 Simmons et al., supra note 238, at 368. 
251 See, e.g., id.; see also LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION: A BIOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON 
ENTREPRENEURS IN GOVERNMENT (Jameson Doig & Erwin C. Hargrove eds., 1987).  The term is 
also sometimes used to refer to businesses who pursue a rent-seeking strategy.  See, e.g., Matthew 
McCaffrey & Joseph T. Salerno, A Theory of Political Entrepreneurship, 2 MODERN ECONOMY 
552 (2011). 
252 Simmons et al., supra note 238. 
253 Justin Fox, Uber Is Lobbying for All of Us, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 29, 2015). 
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Second, political entrepreneurs have usually had one of two primary 
(compatible) motivations: a values-based preference, rooted in ideology or 
otherwise, for a particular policy, or advancing their political careers.  Regulatory 
entrepreneurs, in contrast, are primarily motivated by the desire to earn profits.   
 
Third, while political entrepreneurs are individuals, usually elected 
officials, regulatory entrepreneurs are primarily privately owned businesses.  One 
key implication of this pertains to how policies spread across jurisdictions.  
Because of the structure of the U.S. political system, politicians usually have 
bases of support centered on particular geographic areas.  A mayor is well 
equipped to influence policy in her city, but her network strength is unlikely to 
reach other jurisdictions.  It is true that successful mayors often parlay that 
success into election to statewide office, and that successful state politicians often 
parlay that success into national political office.254  However, the positions 
available at higher levels of government are structurally limited—the number of 
governors, members of Congress, and Presidents are fixed—which constrains the 
amount of movement that can occur up the chain, especially when incumbents’ 
well-documented electoral advantages are taken into account.255  Moreover, in our 
federalist system, different levels of government have dominion over different 
questions.  Thus, many issues that a mayor might build a coalition around do not 
translate to state politics; the same issue applies for state politicians moving to the 
national political arena.  Furthermore, politicians in the United States generally do 
not move among parallel levels of government; a successful mayor of San Diego 
is not likely to run for mayor of Los Angeles.  Similarly, in modern U.S. political 
history, no candidate has ever been elected governor of two different states.256   
 
Businesses, in contrast, are not constrained in the same ways.  The number 
of businesses of a particular size or operating in a given industry is not 
intrinsically fixed.  More importantly, businesses are focused on growing their 
customer bases geographically in a way that politicians generally are not.  Thus, a 
business that succeeds in establishing a winning electoral coalition that works at 
the city level in San Diego is much more likely to try to repeat its success in Los 
Angeles, or from one state to another.    
 
Taken together, these differences suggest that regulatory entrepreneurship 
will lead to different coalitions being formed, and therefore different laws being 
enacted, than has been the case historically.  Regulatory entrepreneurship seems 
most likely to have the largest effect on policymaking at the local and state level, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Martin O’Malley, for example, was elected Mayor of Baltimore, then Governor of Maryland, 
then unsuccessfully sought the Democratic Party nomination for President. 
255 See, e.g., Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House 
Elections Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478 (1996). 
256 Bill Federer, Only Man Ever Elected Governor of 2 States, WND (Oct. 21, 2015), 
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in the sphere of economic regulation, and to feature groups that are not currently 
as organized in American politics.   
 
2. The Problem of Asymmetric Benefit Concentration 
 
Every political process is imperfect,257 and ours is no exception.  Scholars 
have documented a number of pathologies that can lead to inefficient outcomes.258  
One common circumstance in which the political process can often produce 
suboptimal outcomes is when there are asymmetries between how a policy’s costs 
and benefits are distributed.   
 
For example, consider a policy that produces concentrated benefits but 
diffuse costs—that is, it provides significant benefits to a relatively small group of 
people, while imposing relatively small costs on each member of a large group of 
people.  In such circumstances, the beneficiaries of the proposed policy have a lot 
of incentive to fight for that policy.  On the other hand, each of those who would 
be hurt by the policy has little incentive to resist it, since she would suffer only a 
small loss if it were enacted.  These asymmetric incentives can result in the policy 
being enacted, even if the policy inflicts more aggregate harm to those hurt by it 
than it benefits the policy’s proponents.  
 
There are a number of policy areas that embody this dynamic.  Many 
involve incumbent members of an industry using legal restrictions to exclude 
potential competitors.  This reduced competition enables the incumbent firms to 
charge higher prices, which can significantly raise their profits.  Moreover, the 
incumbent firms are often organized into a trade association and, in some 
instances, a handful of firms may account for a large portion of total market share.  
This gives them strong incentive to push for these policies, and makes collective 
action easier.  At the same time, the increased costs are spread over a large group 
of customers as well as would-be competitors.  This gives each of the policy’s 
natural opponents little incentive to lobby against it and makes it difficult to 
organize and coordinate opponents’ efforts.   
 
a. Occupational Licensing and Protectionism 
 
There are several ways in which incumbents can enact protectionist 
legislation, but one of the best-known examples is occupational licensing—
regulations that require individuals to obtain a government license or other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1970).  According 
to Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem, there are no procedures for collective or social ordering of 
alternative choices that satisfy reasonable assumptions concerning the autonomy of the people and 
the rationality of their preferences.  As such, there is no perfect set of decision-making processes 
or institutions.  WILLIAM ROBERTS CLARK ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 11 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
258 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, The Usefulness of Core Theory in Economics, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 
(Spring 1994); see also Jordan M Barry et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A 
Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103 (2013).  
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official permission to pursue a particular vocation or profession.  Occupational 
licensing requirements have expanded dramatically in the last sixty years; in 
1950, fewer than 5% of Americans worked in jobs that required licenses, versus 
roughly 10% in 1980 and more than 30% today.259  Clearly, occupational 
licensing can be useful;260 few people favor abandoning all licensing for surgeons 
or architects, for example.  But licensing has spread far beyond the traditional 
professions, and many commentators have questioned the rationale for licensing 
occupations such as auctioneers, boxing timekeepers, and hair braiders.261  In 
many instances, securing these licenses can be extremely costly; for example, in 
some states, simply braiding hair for money requires years of classes and 
thousands of dollars in tuition.262  
 
Overly protectionist occupational licensing has many problems.  It makes 
it harder for workers to shift between industries, fueling unemployment.  It makes 
products and services more expensive for customers and harder to obtain.  It has 
been derided by politicians on both sides of the aisle, and the President recently 
proposed $15 million to study its effects, to applause from both the left and the 
right.263    
 
Yet these rules have spread and proven difficult to fight because of the 
political economy dynamics.264  Regulated groups fight vigorously to keep their 
protections, but most voters pay little attention to these issues; elections rarely 
turn on the rules that govern hair braiders, opticians, interior designers, or 
athletes’ agents.265  	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262 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 261 (discussing one would-be hair braider’s experience in Utah, 
which requires “nearly two years of school and $16,000 in tuition”); Institute for Justice, Braiding 
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and Arkansas, among others). 
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As a result, this problem has been a difficult one to crack.  But regulatory 
entrepreneurship has made some inroads where more traditional politics has not.  
Restrictive taxicab regulations endured for decades nationwide, but Uber has 
transformed the landscape in a short amount of time.  For example, in the last 
seventy-five years, New York City increased its cab fleet from approximately 
12,000 cab medallions to 13,000.266  In Uber’s four years in New York City, it 
added almost 12,000 new for-hire cars to the city’s streets.267  Uber has had 
significant effects on taxi regulations in many other cities as well.268   
 
State laws requiring car manufacturers to sell through independent dealers 
are another form of entry restrictions or protectionism that have proved similarly 
durable, withstanding several efforts from the big car companies to repeal 
them.269  But in its decade of existence, Tesla motors has made real inroads 
against these laws, including convincing several states to pass new legislation that 
allows direct sales of automobiles to consumers.270   
 
b. Restrictive Zoning 
 
Restrictive zoning regulations provide a second example of how 
asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits can produce questionable policy.  
Most people in the United States currently live in apartments or houses that they 	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own or rent for relatively long periods of time; in the past, a broader range of 
housing options were common.271  Many people were boarders, renting rooms in 
families’ homes; others lived in rooming houses or residential hotels.272  Over 
time, zoning rules made these increasingly scarce.  A major driver of this process 
was that these restrictions, by reducing the supply of housing, created 
concentrated benefits for local homeowners by raising the value of their homes, 
while the costs were spread more diffusely.  Over time, the restricted supply of 
housing has contributed to a dramatic increase in housing prices.273  
 
The restrictive zoning described above extends to other types of land use 
as well.  Hosting a dinner party for your friends is legal, but if you were to serve 
the same dinner to paying customers, you would run afoul of regulations in many 
cities.274  Most cities require developments to set aside large amounts of space for 
parking.275  And so on.  Taken together, these restrictions have had an enormous 
negative impact, producing massive demographic shifts, reducing economic 
growth, and damaging the environment.276      
 
Regulatory entrepreneurship has the potential to partially ameliorate some 
of these problems.  For example, it does not seem coincidental that one of 
Airbnb’s toughest fights has been in San Francisco, a city with particularly 
restrictive zoning rules.277  San Francisco is located on a peninsula, so the only 
obvious way for the city to add housing units and business space is to grow 
vertically.278  Yet most of San Francisco’s neighborhoods restrict maximum 
building height to forty feet, and severely restrict how those buildings can be 
utilized.279  At the same time, local homeowners have strong incentives to resist 
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development, and they have done so280—and the cost of residential and 
commercial real estate has soared.281  Airbnb, by enabling rental transactions that 
would otherwise not be possible, allows greater utilization of existing space and 
structures, effectively expanding the supply of real estate.282  Moreover, by 
allowing property owners and tenants to lease out unused residential space, 
Airbnb increases the range of uses to which property can be put.  Similarly, 
Airbnb has launched a dinner sharing venture that allows users to host dinner 
parties for paying guests—effectively turning residential property into small 
restaurants.283  Airbnb is hardly unique in this respect; many other regulatory 
entrepreneurs’ businesses undermine and reduce the impact of overly restrictive 
zoning regimes.284    
 
3. The Limits of Regulatory Entrepreneurship 
 
While regulatory entrepreneurship can ameliorate some of the political 
economy problems described above, it is no panacea.  The limits and potential 
downsides of regulatory entrepreneurship are considerable. 
 
First, regulatory entrepreneurs’ ability to change the law will vary 
significantly depending on the nature of the business and the law in question; this 
creates real limits on regulatory entrepreneurs’ ability to effect legal change.  As 
noted above, platform companies are particularly well-suited for regulatory 
entrepreneurship, but the platform model is not always a good fit for a particular 
business.  Moreover, some policy problems are not well-suited to a business of 
any type; a successful business based around fundamental tax reform seems 
unlikely, for example. 
    
Even when regulatory entrepreneurship is a viable business strategy, 
regulatory entrepreneurs are not saints or altruists; they are profit-seeking actors, 
and they will generally use their political power to further their profit-seeking 
goals.  Simply put, regulatory entrepreneurs do not want to get the socially 	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Out Parking Spots by the Hour, TORONTO STAR (May 21, 2015), 
http://www.thestar.com/business/2015/05/21/parking-apps-will-allow-owners-to-rent-out-parking-
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optimal result, they want the result that is best for them.  This can lead to sub-
optimal outcomes in a variety of ways. 
 
To start, it is possible that the regulatory entrepreneur may push social 
policy away from the optimal outcome.  The most direct way this can happen is 
when the regulatory entrepreneur’s business is built on reversing an efficient 
regulatory regime.285  It is plausible that a regulatory entrepreneur who succeeds 
in building enough popular support to change the law is likely increasing general 
welfare, but this will not always be true.  Popular support is a good indicator that 
a change in the law is a positive one, but there are several circumstances in which 
popular support may give little confidence that a legal change is efficient.   
 
One such scenario is when a law’s chief purpose is to address an 
externality that falls outside the jurisdiction.  For instance, suppose Acmeville is 
considering relaxing its restrictions on water pollution, and that the main body of 
water affected is a river that flows through many other cities.  Assuming that the 
proposed change is inefficient, a company based in Acmeville might still be able 
to gather substantial local support for it, because the Acmeville voters do not reap 
many of the benefits that the current law provides.   
 
A second circumstance in which popular support may be entitled to less 
weight is when there is a strong paternalism argument.  This can arise when there 
is a reason to believe people will fail to adequately look out for their own 
interests, such as laws restricting gambling out of concern for the social costs of 
gambling addictions and the impact on disadvantaged or vulnerable 
populations.286  It can also arise when people have poor information that prevents 
them from understanding what they are getting or giving up by taking a certain 
action.287     
 
Regulatory entrepreneurship can also produce inefficiency in smaller 
ways; the regulatory entrepreneur may use its power to improve one policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 For example, assume that cities’ existing taxicab rules were efficient.  Uber, by pushing to 
change those rules, would be moving society away from the optimal outcome.  This is potentially 
consistent with Uber having popular support for its efforts:  The efficient regime could involve 
small losses for many that are dwarfed by corresponding gains for others.  Uber may merely have 
succeeded in organizing the former.    
286 See Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal 
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1569 (1999) (“For more than a century, Americans have believed that 
the social ills fostered by gambling outweigh its recreational value.  As a result, gambling has 
been extensively regulated . . ..”); see also Christopher Koopman & Jim Pagels, The Doomed 
Crusade Against Daily Fantasy Sites, NATIONAL REVIEW (Nov. 16, 2015, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/427106/doomed-crusade-against-daily-fantasy-sports-
christopher-koopman-jim-pagels (criticizing the legal developments against fantasy sports 
company sites as paternalistic and not serving the interest of consumer protection). 
287 See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-The-
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securities regulation is that investors need protection not only against those who would take 
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outcome while worsening others.  For example, many economists look favorably 
on Uber’s efforts to increase competition in the taxi industry and to make prices 
more flexible.288  At the same time, Uber has often pushed for lower levels of 
required insurance coverage and less rigorous background checks than regulators 
favored.289  It is plausible that Uber’s preferred outcomes on these issues are 
inefficient, and that the regulators would forge a better rule without Uber’s 
influence.  Similar questions arise with respect to Uber’s attempts to have its 
drivers treated as independent contractors instead of employees.290   
 
Even when regulatory entrepreneurs are fighting to improve inefficient 
laws, they may produce limited reform measures that meet the company’s goals, 
but do not address larger social concerns.  For example, Tesla’s New Jersey law, 
considered a huge political victory for Tesla, is quite narrow.  It only allows Tesla 
to operate up to four dealerships in the state.291  More significantly, it only applies 
to companies that manufacture zero-emissions vehicles and that were licensed by 
New Jersey prior to 2014—essentially, only Tesla.292  In Washington, the bill 
Tesla secured enables it to open as many dealerships as it likes, but the bill is 
similarly restricted to companies licensed in the state before 2014, which again 
means just Tesla.293  Other innovators—for example, Elio Motors, which has 
announced plans to produce a car that retails for $6,800 and gets 84 miles per 
gallon on the highway—would not qualify.294  Similarly, when Elio has lobbied 
states for legislation permitting it to make direct sales to consumers, the Elio-
enabling bills are sufficiently narrow that they do not apply to Tesla.295   
 
These types of grandfathering rules are quite common.  For instance, the 
Air Cargo Deregulation Act enabled the growth of the modern air cargo industry 
and was heavily instigated by Federal Express.296  The act gave special positive 
treatment to existing carriers—essentially, Federal Express and Flying Tiger 
Line—including a one-year window during which they could enter new markets 
without competition.297  But perhaps the best example comes from 
ResponsibleOhio, which put forward a ballot measure to legalize marijuana in 
Ohio—but only if it was grown at one of ten predetermined sites, all of which 
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were owned by ResponsibleOhio.298  This would have given ResponsibleOhio a 
monopoly on legal marijuana sales in the state.299   
 
More fundamentally, some people might worry about giving business 
interests additional political power.300  And because much of law involves 
limiting and managing harms, politically empowering companies that intend to 
“move fast and break things” could be particularly problematic.301  For instance, 
Uber has flouted not only taxi regulations, but also campaign finance laws.302  
Uber’s aggressive lobbying tactics have bled into other parts of its operations as 
well.  Uber’s Operation Slog was a concerted effort to recruit drivers from rival 
Lyft by having paid operatives disguise their identities—they created fake Lyft 
accounts, linked to burner phones and new credit cards—then hailed rides with 
Lyft.303  During those rides, the operatives would solicit their Lyft drivers to 
switch to Uber.304  When Lyft started offering service in New York City, Uber 
falsely told its drivers that New York regulations prohibited drivers from working 
for both Uber and Lyft.305  Uber has been dogged by persistent rumors that it had 
its employees order and then cancel thousands of rides from competing 
companies.306  Perhaps most troubling, a top Uber executive suggested spending 
millions of dollars on private investigators to dig up dirt on the personal lives and 
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families of specific journalists who were critical of Uber.307  Uber has since 




 Regulatory entrepreneurs abound, and include some of the world’s most 
valuable companies, both public and private.  Although companies such as Uber, 
Airbnb, DraftKings, Tesla, and Hyperloop are engaged in vastly different areas of 
business, they are all regulatory entrepreneurs:  Each has built a business in an 
area fraught with legal issues, such as legal gray areas, unfavorable laws, and 
potential instability.  Each of these companies has done so with the plan of 
remaking the legal landscape into one that supports its business.  To do this, 
regulatory entrepreneurs blend political and economic actions in innovative ways 
and have changed the balance of power on many political fronts.  
 
Moreover, we believe that companies will continue to engage in 
regulatory entrepreneurship in the future and perhaps will do so even more 
frequently.  As information technology rapidly advances, it lowers the cost of 
political engagement.  This may allow for a feedback loop in which the greater 
ease with which citizens can express their preferences creates new opportunities 
for companies to mobilize large groups of people to push for legal changes on 
their behalf.  Companies’ successes then make investors increasingly comfortable 
with regulatory entrepreneurship as a business strategy, which expands the 
already-significant infrastructure (including information technology) that supports 
regulatory entrepreneurship companies.   
 
 This raises the question of how regulatory entrepreneurship will ultimately 
affect the mix of laws and regulations that society enacts.  The most successful 
regulatory entrepreneurs’ chief source of political power is their army of activated 
users.  Presumably, those members of the public who form the foot soldiers in the 
regulatory entrepreneur’s political army are furthering their own self-interest by 
supporting the entrepreneur, and thus stand to gain from policy change along with 
the entrepreneur.  Thus, we are cautiously optimistic that the dynamics we 
describe could encourage more efficient legislative regimes, particularly at the 
state and local levels.  Regulatory entrepreneurs are profit-seeking entities, 
however; there is strong reason to believe they will use their political power to 
pursue their own interests, with little regard to other stakeholders or society.  	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Accordingly, regulatory entrepreneurship may have significant negative effects.  
How these positives and negatives weigh out will vary across different companies 
and circumstances.   
 
